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THE MYTH OF THE SHARING ECONOMY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING INNOVATION
Abbey Stemler∗
ABSTRACT
A deflated air mattress rests in the corner of Airbnb’s world headquarters.
It symbolizes how Airbnb allows regular, local people to earn extra income by
renting out space in their homes. Yet, this symbolism fails to represent what the
company has become—a unicorn receiving much of its revenue from
professionals with full-time listings. The poorly folded wad of plastic
exemplifies the Myth of the Sharing Economy, which has been consistently
used to subvert regulation.
The Myth convinces people that the sharing economy is comprised of selfregulating Platforms, which allow microentrepreneurs to utilize their excess
capacity in an altruistic manner. However, the sharing economy is actually
comprised of companies driven as much by market forces and failures as any
taxicab company or hotel chain. The Myth possesses an appeal that is simple
and seductive. It takes the familiar idea of sharing to make the claim that
Platforms are unique and should be subject to new and different regulation or
no regulation at all. This Myth not only harms Platform users, the
environment, and the culture and diversity of communities, but it has enabled
sharing economy Platforms to become powerful influencers in Silicon Valley,
state legislatures, and beyond.
While much has been written regarding the benefits of the sharing
economy and how to regulate it, and disruptive innovations more broadly, this
Article is the first to critique the sharing economy by exploring the intersection
between narrative and regulation. It also distills lessons for regulating future
∗
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innovations and demonstrates the importance of questioning the difference
between rhetoric and reality to achieve public policy goals.

INTRODUCTION
If you walk through the sundrenched spaces of the world headquarters of
Airbnb, the online accommodation Platform, you will notice that there are no
private offices, not even for the CEO. Instead, collaboration spaces fill the
72,000-square-foot building, many of which are literal translations of Airbnb
listings around the world.1 If you look closely, you will stumble upon an
unremarkable space: a perfect replica of Joe Gebbia and Brian Chesky’s
apartment circa 2007.2 It was there that the two blew up air mattresses for the
first time and allowed people to pay a small fee to sleep on their floor. It was
also there that they monetized their excess capacity, made rent, and birthed a
$31 billion company.3
A deflated air mattress rests in the corner of the facsimile birthplace.4 It
symbolizes the inspirational story of Airbnb, where “regular, local people [can]
make a little extra money by sharing their homes with respectful guests from
around the world.”5 Yet this symbolism of “democratizing capitalism”6 fails to
represent what the company has become. Only approximately 1% of Airbnb
revenues in New York City come from sharing rooms like Gebbia and Chesky
did.7 By contrast, much of Airbnb’s revenues in many cities come from fulltime Airbnb listings.8

1
Eva Hagberg, Airbnb’s San Francisco HQ Embodies a New Spatial Blurring, METROPOLIS (Dec. 2,
2013), http://www.metropolismag.com/December-2013/Rooms-with-a-View/?cparticle=2&siarticle=1.
2
See TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 37 (2015).
3
ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF
CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 7–9 (2016) (discussing the founding story of Airbnb); Ingrid Lunden, Airbnb
Closes $1B Round at $31B Valuation, Profitable as of 2H 2016, No Plans for IPO, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 9,
2017), http://social.techcrunch.com/2017/03/09/airbnb-closes-1b-round-at-31b-valuation-profitable-as-of-2h2016-no-plans-for-ipo/ (describing Airbnb’s valuation as of March 2017).
4
Hagberg, supra note 1.
5
Update from Barcelona, AIRBNB CITIZEN (Mar. 17, 2015), https://barcelona.airbnbcitizen.com/
update-barcelona/.
6
AIRBNB, AIRBNB POLICY TOOL CHEST 2, 13 (2016), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/National_PublicPolicyTool-ChestReport-v3.pdf (“Airbnb is democratizing capitalism by
expanding the economic pie for ordinary people, allowing them to use their home, typically their greatest
expense, to generate supplemental income to pay for costs like food, rent, and their children’s education.”).
7
SLEE, supra note 2 (stating that in New York City 75% of Airbnb’s revenue comes from entire home
rentals and only 1% of revenue comes from shared room listings).
8
See infra Section I.A.2.b.
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Airbnb provides a platform that enables a cadre of new hoteliers to access
customers. But, instead of utilizing excess capacity, these “hosts” are snatching
up desired spaces solely for the purpose of listing them on the site. And in
many places, at least initially, they benefit from loose or absent regulations
made possible by Airbnb’s rhetoric.9 This lack of regulation not only puts
consumers at risk, damages the make-up of neighborhoods, and disrupts the
existing accommodation industry, but it has helped Airbnb become a powerful
influencer in Silicon Valley, city councils, state legislatures, and beyond.10
As Part I of this Article explains, in addition to Airbnb, other “unicorns”11
within the Sharing Economy12 convince communities, regulators, and courts
that they are facilitating altruistic activities that utilize excess capacity, support
job growth, and alter how we consume. This Myth helps these Platforms13
avoid everything from employment laws (by claiming supply-side14 users are
independent contractors) to liability for consumer harm (by claiming they are
technology companies shielded by the Communications Decency Act). As
argued in Part II, this subversion produces numerous market failures and gives
the dominant players in each modality the space they need to grow strong and
powerful via network effects.
Once successful, these Platforms are armed with more than the cash
necessary to influence regulators and courts via lobbyists and attorneys. They
are fortified with formidable legions of users. These users are encouraged,
largely through Platform interfaces, to advocate on behalf of the Platforms and
9

See infra Section I.B.
For a complete discussion of the harms caused by Airbnb and other Sharing Economy Platforms, see
infra Section II.B.
11
A “unicorn” is a startup company valued at over a billion dollars. Words We’re Watching: The
Billion-Dollar Unicorn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/unicornwords-we’re-watching (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
12
As discussed in Part I, there is no doubt that the word “sharing” is a misnomer. Out of a need for a
term to describe the phenomenon, this Article uses the term “Sharing Economy,” and capitalizes the term to
refer to all businesses that utilize platforms to connect people who have goods and services to offer with those
who are willing to purchase them. It should be noted, however, that in previous scholarship, the author of this
Article has defined Sharing Economy companies as companies with four key characteristics: (1) the company
has an online platform; (2) that platform relies on microbusinesses to provide goods and services; (3) the goods
and services offered by the microbusinesses consist of their excess capacity in their personal assets and
schedules; and (4) the platform facilitates high-powered information exchange about user trustworthiness via
reputation systems and other means. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy,
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 57–63 (2016). However, as we now can see, most successful Sharing Economy
companies do not contain all four of these components (particularly excess capacity and microbusinesses). For
a complete discussion of the definition, see id.
13
The capitalized word “Platform” is used throughout this article to refer to companies within the
Sharing Economy.
14
“Supply-side users” are individuals who sell their excess capacity.
10
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drive regulatory agendas. As a result, Part III demonstrates how most Sharing
Economy regulations simply codify existing business practices, leaving
concerns about consumer privacy, worker protections, anticompetitive
behavior, and discrimination among other issues unaddressed. How Platforms
have accomplished this type of regulatory avoidance is worth understanding,
particularly as regulators prepare to tackle the market failures of future
network technologies.
While much has been written about the benefits of the Sharing Economy
and how to regulate it,15 this Article is the first to critique the sharing economy
by exploring the intersection between narrative and regulation.16 In particular,
it shines a light on how start-ups that defy existing legal norms and
classifications achieve and maintain power. While excellent articles have been
written about the strategy used by innovative firms to avoid regulations, this
Article breaks down the rhetorical devices used by firms to avoid legal rules

15
See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH L. REV. 1397, 1435 (2016)
(applying pluralistic theory to the regulation of the Sharing Economy); Raymond H. Brescia, Regulating the
Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights into an Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy, 95 NEB. L.
REV. 87, 91–93, 106, 133 (2016) (describing how regulators can adopt lessons learned from the regulation of
the legal profession to regulate the Sharing Economy); Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for
Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 27 (2015) (arguing in favor of co-regulatory approaches in which
industry and government work together to develop and enforce regulations for the sharing economy); Molly
Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 117 (2015) (arguing how Platforms can self-regulate and address market
failures); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System,
90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 288–89 (2015) (discussing how to view Sharing Economy Platforms as something
distinct from traditional Coasian firms and regulate them accordingly); Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien
Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies like Airbnb and Uber?,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 295 (2016) (arguing that sharing economy policy “requires a regulatory
framework that simultaneously allows the key efficiencies the platforms seek to offer and assures that they
adequately address the rights of consumers and third parties”); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101
MINN. L. REV. 87, 117 (2016) (arguing that the Sharing Economy defies conventional regulatory theory);
Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147, 184 (2016)
(discussing current approaches to regulating the sharing economy); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 423 (2015)
(analyzing the Sharing Economy and proposing regulations from an “innovation law” perspective).
16
Cristiano Codagnone, Federico Biagi, and Fabienne Abadie do explore rhetoric’s role in the Sharing
Economy in their extensive policy report for the European Union; however, they do not specifically address
the impact rhetoric has had on the regulation of the Sharing Economy. Cristiano Codagnone et al., European
Comm’n: Joint Research Ctr., The Passions and the Interests: Unpacking the “Sharing Economy,” EUR
27914 EN 6, 12 (2016). Similarly, Chris Martin describes the discourse and frames used within the Sharing
Economy but does not focus specifically on their relation to regulation. Chris J. Martin, The Sharing Economy:
A Pathway to Sustainability or a Nightmarish Form of Neoliberal Capitalism?, 121 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 149,
150–51 (2016).
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and obligations.17 The Article concludes by distilling key lessons for regulating
future innovations and demonstrates the importance of questioning the
difference between rhetoric and reality to achieve the desired ends of
regulation.
I.

MYTH MAKING

This Part briefly describes the initial excitement surrounding the Sharing
Economy. It then exposes the elements that make up its Myth. By clearly
understanding the Myth, we can begin to see how it has contributed to the
under-regulation of the Sharing Economy.
A. The Honeymoon Stage
In the early 2010s, the Sharing Economy was considered a social, political,
and economic transformation that was “democratizing how we produce,
consume, govern, and solve social problems.”18 Many thought, and some still
do, that the Sharing Economy signaled a revolution that would empower
ordinary people to utilize their personal excess capacity in a variety of ways.19
Others believed it could present a new form of the American Dream.20
The Sharing Economy excited people, governments, and entrepreneurs
around the world because it appeared to provide economic opportunities for a
broad cross-section of society.21 Many believed it allowed people to bridge the
gap between permanent job opportunities and to pursue entrepreneurial
endeavors and the creative arts.22 And with some Platforms, that may be the
17
See, e.g., Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T
to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2017) (discussing how entrepreneurs exploit legal loopholes or challenge
existing regulatory structures in order to grow creating “policy disruptions”); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M.
Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017) (discussing how innovative firms
make “changing the law a material part of [their] business plan” and how firms identify this activity as
“regulatory entrepreneurship”).
18
SHAREABLE, HOW TO: SHARE, SAVE MONEY & HAVE FUN 6 (Tom Llewellyn & Neal Gorenflo eds.,
2016).
19
See Adam Trisk, Why the Sharing Economy Is More Than a Trend—It’s a Revolution, INC. (Apr. 8,
2016), http://www.inc.com/adam-trisk/why-the-sharing-economy-is-more-than-a-trend-its-a-revolution.html.
20
Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
1, 12 (2012).
21
See Martin, supra note 16, at 153–54.
22
The U.S. Conference of Mayors in June 2013 stated, “Sharing Economy companies have proven to
be engines of innovation and job creation, driving economic development in the hearts of American cities,
where joblessness is still most pervasive.” U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS AT THE
81ST ANNUAL MEETING 187 (2013), http://iiusa.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/resolutions-adopted.pdf.
“Sharing leverages a wide variety of resources and lowers barriers to starting small businesses,” with the
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case. For example, Airbnb reports that 45% of their hosts in Portland, Oregon
are “self-employed, freelancers, or part-time workers, [and] 12% of [these]
hosts . . . have used Airbnb income to support themselves while launching a
new business.”23 Uber reports that 74% of its drivers do so “to help maintain a
steady source of income to supplement . . . unpredictable earnings.”24
However, as described in the subsections below, there is more to the story
because supply-side users either lack needed worker protections or are fullfledged businesses subverting regulations.
With regard to the environment, some thought that by tapping into excess
capacity, the Sharing Economy could help save the world by allowing people
to “meet the speed, scale, and local adaption requirements [necessary] to
address climate change in time to prevent the catastrophic change that we’ve
set in motion.”25 In fact 76% of adults familiar with the Sharing Economy
believe it is good for the environment.26 Presumably the Sharing Economy can
reduce the need for capital-intensive infrastructure (such as hotels) and durable
goods (such as cars) since the excess capacity in these spaces and goods is
exploited.27 And, because people often have a personal interaction with the
owner of assets in the Sharing Economy, they tend to be more considerate
when using those assets. As Airbnb reports, guests in North America consume

outsourcing of tasks and “innovations like shared workspaces, shared commercial kitchens, communityfinanced start-ups, community-owned commercial centers, and spaces for ‘pop-up’ businesses.” JANELLE ORSI
ET AL., SHAREABLE & SUSTAINABLE ECONS. LAW CTR., POLICIES FOR SHAREABLE CITIES: A SHARING
ECONOMY POLICY PRIMER FOR URBAN LEADERS 30 (2013).
23
Molly Turner, The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland, AIRBNB (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://perma.cc/M54J-PSGU; see also Stemler, supra note 12, at 40.
24
Jonathan Hall, In the Driver’s Seat: A Closer Look at the Uber Partner Experience, UBER
NEWSROOM (Jan. 22, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/in-the-drivers-seat-understanding-the-uber-partnerexperience/.
25
ROBIN CHASE, PEERS INC, HOW PEOPLE AND PLATFORMS ARE INVENTING THE COLLABORATIVE
ECONOMY AND REINVENTING CAPITALISM 4 (2015); see Sara Gutterman, How the Sharing Economy Will Save
Our Economy and the Environment, GREEN BUILDER (June 19, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.
greenbuildermedia.com/blog/sharing-economy-revolution (stating how the Sharing Economy presents a better
form of consumption by “blend[ing] the world of profitability and sustainability”); Harald Heinrichs, Sharing
Economy: A Potential New Pathway to Sustainability, 22 GAIA 228 (2013); Jim Pickell, How the Sharing
Economy Helps in the Fight Against Climate Change, HUFFPOST (Dec. 10, 2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/jim-pickell/how-the-sharing-economy-h_b_8761184.html.
26
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SHARING ECONOMY: CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES 9 (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharingeconomy.pdf.
27
The Sharing Economy can also address peak load problems within the transportation and
accommodation industries when demand is unusually high (e.g., for a sporting event, convention, etc.). See
EconTalk: Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (July 7, 2014), http://www.
econtalk.org/archives/2014/07/michael_munger.html.
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63%–71% less energy than traditional hotel guests.28 However, we are only
seeing part of the story because many of the environmental benefits of the
Sharing Economy have yet to fully materialize.
While the benefits of the Sharing Economy were and are many, the
honeymoon phase of the Sharing Economy revolution is certainly over.29 The
Sharing Economy’s “dark side”30 has been revealed in many ways—lack of
worker protections,31 discrimination among participants,32 damage to the fabric
of local communities,33 and threats to consumer safety34 and fair competition.35
While these kinds of market failures are not uncommon among burgeoning
industries, what is troubling is the role rhetoric has played in convincing
people that the Sharing Economy need not be regulated.
B. Elements of the Myth
In Plato’s Gorgias, Gorgias defined “rhetoric” as “the art of persuasion.”36
This Article employs a similarly expansive definition of rhetoric and includes
all speech used with the intent to persuade. This broad definition is necessary
because rhetoric, as applied to public opinion formation, is a topic of study for
a variety of disciplines (political science, psychology, communication,
sociology, economics, etc.). This Article draws upon several of these
disciplines, but most heavily relies on contributions from the field of political
science.37 Generally speaking, and from whatever angle, rhetoric is powerful
because it can be used to shape arguments and preclude socially acceptable
28

CLEANTECH GROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF HOME SHARING: PHASE 1 REPORT (2014).
Codagnone et al., supra note 16, at 13; see also Martin, supra note 16, at 149 (arguing that views on
the Sharing Economy now tend to rest on one of two extremes: a “niche of socio-digital experiments” or a
“niche . . . integrating digital technologies into socio-technical structures”).
30
Arvind Malhotra & Marshall Van Alstyne, Economic and Business Dimensions: The Dark Side of the
Sharing Economy . . . and How to Lighten It, 57 COMM. ACM, Nov. 2014, at 24, 24.
31
Because most Platforms view supply-side users as independent contractors, they are not eligible for a
host of employment-related benefits—such as health and unemployment insurance—and protections from
discrimination. Gillian B. White, In the Sharing Economy, No One’s an Employee, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/in-the-sharing-economy-no-ones-an-employee/395027/.
32
See infra note 151.
33
Malhotra & Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 24 (describing how tourists do not always respect
communities and how renting out homes may drive up housing prices).
34
See infra note 154.
35
Stephen P. King, Sharing Economy: What Challenges for Competition Law? 6 J. EUR. COMPETITION
L. & PRAC. 729, 730 (2015) (describing the competition law implications of the Sharing Economy).
36
Plato, GORGIAS 10 (Watchmaker Publ’g, 2010). For a full discussion of this definition, see Anthony
T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. REV. 677, 677 (1999).
37
The many fields that study rhetoric and public opinion remain largely siloed. See James N.
Druckman, What’s It All About?: Framing in Political Science, in PERSPECTIVES ON FRAMING 279, 279–302
(Gideon Keren ed., 2011).
29
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rebuttals, which can force people to endorse stances that go against their or
society’s best interests.38
The use of rhetoric in the sphere of public discourse to influence public
policy runs parallel to the birth of public policy itself. As historian James
Burns explains, the more democratic societies become, the more important
rhetoric is to convince individuals of what they should believe and whom they
should follow.39 “Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons
with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with
others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to
arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”40 Effective rhetoricians
convince their audiences by using particular terms that cause visceral reactions
in listeners and by framing arguments in precise ways.41
If we look backward in time (although we need not go too far), we can see
how disruptive and ambitious Platforms grew using the most positive and
inspiring characteristics of the Sharing Economy to distort perceptions and
avoid regulation. As demonstrated in the subsections below, framing and
precise wording confused and overemphasized the positive aspects of the
Sharing Economy and compelled the public and lawmakers to support this
nascent and fast-moving industry. These two elements of rhetoric, frames and
word choice, make up the Myth of the Sharing Economy.42
1. Word Choice
Word choice influences how people perceive issues and in turn how they
feel about those issues.43 This is why policymakers carefully leverage the
power of words, and politicians often conduct research studies to determine the
38
See generally Ronald R. Krebs & Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms:
The Power of Political Rhetoric, 13 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 35, 38, 42 (2007) (discussing the centrality of rhetoric
to political processes and outcomes).
39
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHIP 11, 26 (1978).
40
Id. at 18.
41
David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 659–60 (2010)
(describing how frames and word choice influence our understanding of intellectual property law).
42
Note that the word “myth” in this Article is used generally to indicate the powerful, consequential,
and dominate discourse used by Sharing Economy Platforms. As with other terms used in this Article, such as
“rhetoric” and “frames,” I do not delve into their metaphysics; however, there are several sources that are
helpful to appreciate the complexity of these terms. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NARRATIVE 5
(David Herman ed., 2007); BRUCE LINCOLN, THEORIZING MYTH: NARRATIVE, IDEOLOGY, AND SCHOLARSHIP
ix (1999); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103, 103–21
(2007).
43
Elspeth Gustavson, Rhetoric: How Politicians Manipulate Language and the Media to Shape
Public Thought, 8 HINCKLEY J. POL. 29, 29–30 (2007).
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precise language capable of creating a wanted public reaction and often
conduct research studies to determine the precise language capable of creating
a wanted public reaction.44 For example, in 2003, pollster Frank Luntz advised
the Republican Party:
It’s time for us to start talking about “climate change” instead of
global warming . . . . “Climate change” is less frightening than
“global warming.” As one focus group participant noted, climate
change “sounds like you’re going from Pittsburgh to Fort
Lauderdale.” While global warming has catastrophic connotation
attached to it, climate change suggests a more controllable and less
emotional challenge.45

Other areas where word choice has been used to drive regulation include the
“death tax”46 and “pro-life.”47 Invoking rhetorical tropes makes arguments
accessible and colors them with shades of morality.48
The term “Sharing Economy” is a model of how word choice can influence
perceptions. Adopted by most Platforms, the term invokes notions of “helping
others” and “community.”49 A Pew Research study found that 40% of
respondents who had heard of the term Sharing Economy and could give a
classifiable description of it focused more on the sharing part of the phrase
than the economy aspect.50 Indeed, many of these participants thought of
sharing literally, with individuals sharing resources in a charitable manner.51
Others associated the term with neighborliness, “frequently using words like
‘community’ or ‘friends’ in their responses.”52
Platforms have been eager to position themselves under the Sharing
Economy umbrella because of the “positive symbolic meaning of sharing, the
magnetism of innovative digital technologies, and the rapidly growing volume
of sharing activity.”53 As Cristiano Codagnone, Federico Biagi, and Fabienne
Abadie argue, the term encompasses so many activities that it confuses the
issues surrounding how to regulate the Sharing Economy because “[i]t is at
times difficult to ascertain whether advocates, opponents, regulators, and
policy makers are discussing the same phenomenon.”54 This confusion helps
highly-profitable Platforms better associate themselves with firms that are
voluntary gift exchanges such as CouchSurfing—a Platform that facilitates
“free” homes stays—or Freecycle, a sharing site that allows you to gift

44

Id.
STEVEN POOLE, UNSPEAK: HOW WORDS BECOME WEAPONS, HOW WEAPONS BECOME A MESSAGE,
AND HOW THAT MESSAGE BECOMES REALITY, 42 (2006) (emphasis omitted); see Gustavson supra note 43, at
30.
45
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unwanted goods as opposed to throwing them away.55 When euphemistically
associated with such positive and altruistic images, it is no wonder that
Platforms can mobilize their millions of users to advocate on their behalf, and
politicians become hesitant to appear hostile to the sacrosanct concept of
sharing.56
46
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH, 76–78 (2005) (“Estate tax sounds like it only hits the wealthy but ‘death tax’ sounds like
it hits everyone. They focus grouped this a lot, and people viewed a ‘death tax’ as very unfair. You don’t have
to be really rich to be worried about a death tax.”); see Gustavson supra note 43, at 30.
47
The transition in terminology from “right to life” to “pro-life” has “successfully put abortion in the
frame of ‘life’ and not ‘choice’ because life holds a higher moral priority than choice. In other words, if antiabortionists are ‘pro-life,’ than [sic] pro-choice advocates must be ‘anti-life.’” Gustavson supra note 43, at 30–
31.
48
Fagundes, supra note 41, at 666.
49
Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, How Americans Define the Sharing Economy, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/20/how-americans-define-the-sharingeconomy/. Throughout its blog Uber Newsroom, Uber refers to itself as part of the Sharing Economy. See, e.g.,
Uber and the American Worker; Remarks from David Plouffe, UBER NEWSROOM (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://newsroom.uber.com/1776/. Similarly, throughout its Airbnb Blog, Airbnb refers to itself as a part of the
Sharing Economy. See, e.g., Learning at Airbnb Open 2014, AIRBNB: BLOG (Dec. 9, 2014), http://blog.
atairbnb.com/learning-airbnb-open-2014/. In fact, Brian Chesky, Airbnb’s founder and CEO, said he wants the
Airbnb logo to become a “universal symbol of sharing”. Austin Carr, Airbnb Unveils a Major Rebranding
Effort that Paves the Way for Sharing More Than Homes, FAST COMPANY (July 16, 2014),

https://www.fastcompany.com/3033130/airbnb-unveils-a-major-rebranding-effort-that-paves-the-wayfor-sh (emphasis added). EatWith, a Platform that matches diners with home chefs, describes itself as a part of
the “Sharing Economy” throughout its Facebook page. E.g., EatWith, FACEBOOK (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.facebook.com/pg/
EatWith/posts/?ref=page_internal (featuring a photo with a banner stating, “Celebrating the sharing economy
in Barcelona,” marked with the hashtag “#sharingeconomy”).
50
51

Olmstead & Smith, supra note 49.

Id. (noting that responses include “[h]elping others with what you are able when they are in need,”
and “[h]elping the less fortunate to try and get them back on their feet and be successful”).
52
See id. (reporting that responses include “[h]aving a set of friends and neighbors who borrow each
other’s stuff, so everyone doesn’t need to buy their own rarely used items” and “[c]ommunities owning one
item that is only occasionally used, and sharing it . . . [like a] lawnmower, for example” (third alteration in
original)).
53
Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014),
http://www.greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-economy. Positioning Platform activities
under the umbrella of “sharing” may also be considered “sharewashing.” Anthony Kalamar, Sharewashing Is
the New Greenwashing, OPEDNEWS (May 13, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/
Sharewashing-is-the-New-Gr-by-Anthony-Kalamar-130513-834.html (coining the term “sharewashing” to
refer to misappropriation of the word “sharing” when talking about traditional economic exchanges).
54
Codagnone et al., supra note 16, at 13.
55
Id. at 14.
56
For example, Uber organized riders to send at least 17,000 e-mails to New York City Mayor Bill de
Blasio in response to a proposed temporary cap on ride-company growth. See Carolyn Said, Airbnb, Uber Cast
Themselves as Saviors of the Middle Class, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:16 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.
com/business/article/Airbnb-Uber-We-are-the-saviors-of-the-middle-6620729.php. When New York City
placed regulations on Airbnb hosts, an Airbnb user was able to get over 200,000 signatures to support a
“legalize sharing” campaign. SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 3, at 133. See also infra Part III.
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Despite the common perception, the term “Sharing Economy” is clearly a
misnomer.57 As described in further detail below, dominant companies within
the Sharing Economy (Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, etc.) rarely enable sharing as it is
commonly understood. Instead, cash, as opposed to altruism, motivates supplyside user behavior. It is more appropriate to classify these companies as part of
the “gig economy,” “peer-to-peer economy,” or “on-demand economy,” but
these terms do not spark the positive emotions associated with sharing.58 The
term “Sharing Economy” muddles our ability to see it for what it is, and
hinders a rational debate about policy and regulation.
Sharing Economy firms carefully select other terms to elicit specific
responses. For example, in the 2015 campaign to defeat San Francisco’s
Proposition F, which sought to limit Airbnb rentals to seventy-five days a year
and increase enforcement and penalties of licensing requirements, Airbnb
consistently used the term “home sharing” to refer to its activities.59 And hosts
were presumably encouraged to use the term “home sharer” when they testified
about how Airbnb helped them make ends meet, despite the fact that over 30%
of Airbnb revenue in San Francisco comes from commercial listings.60 The
terms “home sharer” and “home sharing” are used throughout Airbnb press
releases and policy materials.61 Uber is also careful with its word choice.

57
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1406–08 (discussing how the term “Sharing Economy” is a misnomer
because people participate in the Sharing Economy for self-interested reasons); Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura
Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Sharing at All, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/
2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all (discussing how the Sharing Economy is not about
sharing, it is about access to goods and services); Alex Hern, Why the Term “Sharing Economy” Needs to Die,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/05/why-the-termsharing-economy-needs-to-die (arguing that the term “Sharing Economy” is “actively obfuscatory, lumping
together a hugely disparate bunch of companies, many of which push the definition to its limits, and the
biggest examples of which have nothing to do with ‘sharing’ at all”).
58
Lobel, supra note 15, at 89 (listing out the various names given to the Sharing Economy).
59
Biz Carson, Airbnb Has Spent More Than $8 Million Fighting a Proposed Law in San Francisco,
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-spends-8-million-againstprop-f-2015-9.
60
Carolyn Said, Uber, Lyft, Airbnb Harness Users to Lobby Lawmakers for Them, GOV’T TECH. (Jan.
12, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/Uber-Lyft-Airbnb-Harness-Users-to-Lobby-Lawmakers-forThem.html (describing that at public hearings on the San Francisco propositions, Airbnb hosts used
“remarkably similar language that they were ‘home sharers’ who made ends meet by renting to visitors”);
Ariel Stulberg, Airbnb Probably Isn’t Driving Rents Up Much, at Least Not Yet, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 24,
2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/airbnb-probably-isnt-driving-rents-up-much-at-least-notyet/.
61
See, e.g., AIRBNB, supra note 6 (using the term “home sharing” sixty-four times in the thirty-onepage document); New Study Reveals a Greener Way to Travel: Airbnb Community Shows Environmental
Benefits of Home Sharing, AIRBNB (July 31, 2014), https://www.airbnb.com/press/news/new-study-reveals-agreener-way-to-travel-airbnb-community-shows-environmental-benefits-of-home-sharing; SF Needs Clear
Rules for Home Sharing, AIRBNB: S.F. (May 4, 2015, 4:01 PM), https://www.airbnbsf.com/ (“[H]ome sharing
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Instead of simply using the word “driver,” Uber uses the term “driver
partner.”62 This strategic parsing of words ensures that drivers are viewed as
independent contractors and not employees.63 Platforms are skilled at using
words that help them obfuscate their true characteristics and present them in a
favorable light.
2. Frames
Framing involves “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or
issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.”64 Speakers who succeed in defining
the boundaries of an issue can shape public opinion and ultimately influence
policy decisions.65 For example, people’s opinions concerning a potential Ku
Klux Klan rally can be heavily influenced by whether the issue is framed as
one of free speech or of public safety.66 As Dennis Chong argues, the “essence
of public opinion formation” generally relies on framing.67
Examples of how advocates and policymakers use framing are plentiful.68
Take for instance the “War on Terrorism” frame, which emerged after the
September 11 attacks, and allowed policymakers to shape the debate about
privacy and military spending issues in terms of war and national security.69
Frames are especially powerful in emerging technology situations because

is under attack. City bureaucrats want to make it harder for regular San Franciscans to share their homes while
contributing to the community.”); Women Hosts Have Earned Over $10 Billion on Airbnb, AIRBNB
NEWSROOM (Mar. 6, 2017), https://press.atairbnb.com/women-hosts-have-earned-over-10-billion-on-airbnb/.
62
Become a Driver-Partner, UBER: HELP, https://help.uber.com/h/3362f824-b3de-4cc3-979d6bafcbc24290 (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
63
See infra Section I.B.2.b.ii.
64
ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 5 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
65
See Gustavson, supra note 43, at 30; Krebs & Jackson, supra note 38, at 38; see also Druckman,
supra note 37.
66
Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1997).
67
Dennis Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and Liberties, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI.
867, 870 (1993).
68
The importance of framing can be seen in a variety of “issues such as campaign finance (free speech
or democratic corruption?), abortion (rights of mother or rights of unborn child?), gun control (right to bear
arms or public safety?), affirmative action (reverse discrimination or remedial action?), welfare policy
(humanitarianism or overspending?), hate group rallies (free speech or public safety?).” James N. Druckman,
The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23 POL. BEHAV. 225, 235 (2001). See also
Chong & Druckman, supra note 42, at 108–09.
69
Karen Callaghan & Frauke Schnell, Introduction: Framing Political Issues in American Politics, in
FRAMING AMERICAN POLITICS, 1–17 (Karen Callaghan & Frauke Schnell eds., 2005).
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there is ambiguity about the right course of action and people often are looking
for ways to easily understand the situation and form opinions.70
Framing issues is a common, useful, and effective rhetorical tool.
However, policymakers and constituents should question frames that are
manipulative in the sense that they prompt people to form opinions that go
against their values and self-interests, or prompt people to form opinions that
differ from what their opinions would be with complete information.71 In the
sections below, this Article identifies five frames commonly used by Sharing
Economy Platforms. These frames have helped Platforms mobilize proponents,
demobilize opponents, and avoid burdensome regulations. In part, as a result of
these frames, numerous market failures have been left unaddressed; thus, they
present a good opportunity to examine the manipulative effect of framing on
regulating innovation.
a. The Excess Capacity Frame
“Excess capacity” is a manufacturing term used to refer to an underutilized
asset.72 Sharing Economy Platforms assert that they help unlock the excess
capacity people have in their underutilized things (homes, schedules, etc.), and
indeed, Platforms do allow that unlocking to a degree.73 However, many
participants in the Sharing Economy are not using their excess capacity, or
resurrecting “dead capital”;74 instead, many supply-side users are putting new
capacity online, and unfairly competing with incumbent firms. “Super hosts”
on the Airbnb platform are a case-in-point. Airbnb claims that it “promote[s]
efficient use of existing resources, as well as environmentally friendly ways of
traveling.”75 It cites internal studies to suggest that most host income is used to

70
For example, in the 1960s, the “faith in progress” frame was used to allow the use of nuclear power
to spread. Franceca Polletta & M. Kai Ho, Frames and Their Consequences, in 5 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS 187, 188 (Robert E. Goodin & Charles Tilly eds., 2006).
71
Druckman, supra note 37.
72
RP Siegel, Is the Sharing Economy an Opportunity or a Threat to Existing Paradigms?, in THE RISE
OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 20, 20 (TriplePundit.com ed., 2013).
73
For instance, one of Uber’s investors, Shervin Pishevar, calls Uber an example of an “excess
capacity” company. He said, “eBay, which lets people sell unneeded stuff from their garages, was the original
excess-capacity company . . . . This is the next generation.” Alexia Tsotsis, For Limo Service Uber, Downtime
and Idle Resources Are Fuel for Profits, WIRED (June 22, 2012, 12:30 PM) https://www.wired.com/2012/06/
mf_uber/.
74
Dan Rothschild, How Uber and Airbnb Resurrect “Dead Capital,” ÜMLAUT (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.theumlaut.com/2014/04/09/how-uber-and-airbnb-resurrect-dead-capital.
75
Environmental Impacts in Athens, AIRBNB: BLOG (Apr. 22, 2015), http://blog.airbnb.com/
environmental-impacts-in-athens/.
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pay for regular household expenses.76 However, according to New York State
Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, 37% of all Airbnb’s revenue from
New York City in 2010 came from hosts with three or more listings.77 Studies
analyzing other cities have found similar results.78
Similarly, Lending Club and Prosper, which both launched as Facebook
applications aimed at “democratizing finance,” initially relied on social
networks and the trust they engendered to attract borrowers and lenders.79 At
first, the businesses avoided federal and state banking regulations to develop
the traction necessary to pursue venture capital funds; Lending Club claimed it
provided “affordable funding alternatives to the masses”: a “worthy goal.”80 It
even encouraged people to loan out idle cash from savings accounts and
stimulus checks.81 Yet, most of the money for Lending Club loans now comes
from large institutional investors and not individuals with “excess capacity” in
their bank accounts.82 Likewise, Uber drivers are no longer simply using the
76
See The Economic Impacts of Home Sharing in Cities Around the World, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/economic-impact (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
77
RESEARCH DEP’T & INTERNET BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY
10 (2014).
78
According to the American Hotel & Lodging Association, which opposes Airbnb, nearly 30% of
Airbnb’s revenue in fourteen of the United States’ largest cities comes from individuals or entities offering
spaces 360 days per year. AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED
BUSINESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB (2016); see also SLEE, supra note 2, at 37 (reviewing
data from New York City and finding that 40% of all Airbnb revenue comes from hosts with more than one
listing).
79
See Peter Renton, P2P Lending in the USA Turns Ten Years Old, LEND ACAD. (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.lendacademy.com/p2p-lending-in-the-usa-is-ten-years-old/; Dan Kaplan, Lending Club Brings
Person-to-Person Loans to Facebook, VENTUREBEAT (May 24, 2007, 10:28 PM), https://venturebeat.com/
2007/05/24/lending-club-brings-person-to-person-loans-to-facebook/.
80
Welcome to New Peer-to-Peer Lending (P2P Lending) Users, LENDINGCLUB: BLOG (Sept. 21, 2007),
http://blog.lendingclub.com/welcome-to-new-peer-to-peer-lending-p2p-lending-users/. Two years after its
founding, Lending Club complied with Securities and Exchange Commission rules and filed an S-1 statement
seeking registration of $600 million in “Member Payment Dependent Notes” to be issued on its website. Jason
Kincaid, Lending Club Files for SEC Registration, Hopes to Resume Service, TECHCRUNCH (June 20, 2008),
https://techcrunch.com/2008/06/20/lending-club-files-for-sec-registration-hopes-to-resume-service/. However,
“[o]ver the last few years, federal regulators have largely taken a wait-and-see approach with respect to
alternative lending.” Colin Wilhelm, Regulatory Road Likely to Get Bumpier for Alternative Lenders, AM.
BANKER (May 15, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulatory-road-likely-to-get-bumpier-foralternative-lenders. For a timeline of Lending Club’s activities, see Pymnts, A Brief History of Lending Club,
PYMNTS.COM (May 13, 2016), http://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2016/lendingclub-timeline/.
81
Put Your Economic Stimulus Check to Good Use, LENDINGCLUB: BLOG (Feb. 7, 2008),
http://blog.lendingclub.com/put-your-economic-stimulus-check-to-good-use/ (describing how individuals
receiving a stimulus check who are debt-free, or have limited “bad debt,” have a way to add the extra money
from their rebate check to the person-to-person loan portfolio on Lending Club).
82
Amy Cortese, Loans That Avoid Banks? Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/04/business/loans-that-avoid-banks-maybe-not.html?_r=0; see Shelly Banjo, Wall Street Is
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excess capacity in their own cars because Uber is helping drivers rent, lease,
and buy new cars, under what some consider predatory terms.83
Framing the Sharing Economy in the context of sharing excess supply-side
capacity is disingenuous. Most of the time, users are not utilizing their excess
capacity; instead, they are using Platforms to market their newly acquired
property or full-time services for a profit, but Platforms shy away from
exposing that part of the picture. Focusing on the small scale and efficient use
of time, space, and property is, in part, what encourages regulators to take a
hands-off approach, and allows Platforms to grow without any real restraint.84
b. The Microentrepreneur Frame
Related to the excess capacity frame is the middle-class, microentrepreneur
frame. This frame has two distinct boundaries. The first relates to the extent to
which supply-side users utilize Platforms. The second relates to the
classification of these supply-side users as independent contractors as opposed
to employees. As this section demonstrates, some supply-side users tip more
easily into the full-fledged business side of the spectrum (as opposed to
microentrepreneurs), and others are more entrenched in, controlled by, and
dependent on Platforms, which pushes them into the employee side of the
spectrum. Either way, very few supply-side users are truly independent
contractors who earn small amounts of extra “money by providing [their]
skills, time or property.”85

Hogging the Peer-to-Peer Lending Market, QUARTZ (Mar. 4, 2015), http://qz.com/355848/wall-street-ishogging-the-peer-to-peer-lending-market/.
83
Mark Williams, a lecturer at Boston University, stated that the terms of Uber’s leases “are predatory
and are very much driven toward profiting off drivers rather than to facilitate an increase in drivers.” Eric
Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, Inside Uber’s Auto-Lease Machine, Where Almost Anyone Can Get a Car,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016, 11:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/inside-ubers-auto-lease-machine-where-almost-anyone-can-get-a-car.
84
For example, an Anchorage, Alaska assembly person stated that he sees “Uber and Lyft as
independent companies that cater much more to drivers who occasionally use their personal vehicles for the
companies to supplement income,” and that measures to regulate Uber and Lyft like taxis would “destroy” this
income-generating alternative. Devin Kelly, Uber and Lyft get Anchorage Assembly’s OK, but the Companies
are Awaiting State Action, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/anchorage/2017/03/21/assembly-allows-uber-and-lyft-in-anchorage-but-those-ride-booking-companiesare-awaiting-state-action/.
85
Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-findboth-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?mcubz=3&_r=0.

STEMLER_GALLEYPROOFS2

212

12/22/2017 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:197

i. Full-Fledged Businesses
Platforms employ the middle-class, microentrepreneur frame to reinforce
the notion that participants on their Platforms are microentrepreneurs
“struggling to pay the bills” or “transitioning between jobs.”86 Via these
microbusinesses, users offer the little excess capacity they have for sale,
and they, as managers, assume responsibility for all parts of the business that
are not outsourced to the Platforms.87 Since margins are so thin for these hardworking, middle-class microentrepreneurs, and resources are so limited,
Platforms argue that they must not be overly burdened by regulations. Chris
Lehane of Airbnb put it bluntly:
Cities recognize where the world is going, right, they understand that
you’re either going to go forward or you’re going to go
backward . . . . They understand that in a time of economic
inequality, this is a question of whose side are you on: Do you want
to be on the side of the middle class, or do you want to be opposed to
the middle class?88

Nevertheless, a growing portion of some Platforms’ revenue comes from fullfledged businesses that can be burdened by existing regulatory regimes.89 As
previously mentioned, much of Airbnb’s revenue in major cities is generated
by people running full-time rentals without complying with various
regulations, such as taxes and health and safety requirements.90 The company
86
Ted Karczewski, Tech Giants as Lobbyists: Politics Meets the Sharing Economy, SKYWORD:
CONTENTSTANDARD (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.skyword.com/contentstandard/marketing/tech-giants-aslobbyists-politics-meets-the-sharing-economy/ (quoting David Plouffe, Uber and the American Worker,
MEDIUM (Nov. 5, 2015), https://medium.com/@davidplouffe/uber-and-the-american-worker-bdd499ec5323).
87
Airbnb’s Brian Chesky created a photo essay called the “Shared City,” which stated, “Imagine if you
could build a city that is shared. Where people become micro-entrepreneurs, and local mom and pops flourish
once again. Imagine a city that fosters community, where space isn’t wasted, but shared with others.” Brian
Chesky, Shared City, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2014), https://medium.com/@bchesky/shared-city-db9746750a3a. In
an information sheet created by the political lobbying organization of which Airbnb, Lyft, and Uber are
members, the Internet Association stated: “Through the Sharing Economy, microentrepreneurs are able to
work for themselves and control their own schedules to earn extra income.” INTERNET ASS’N, THE SHARING
ECONOMY 1 (2016), https://internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/SharingEcon2Pager5.pdf.
88
Conor Doughtery & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber Mobilize Vast User Base to Sway Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/technology/airbnb-and-uber-mobilize-vast-userbase-to-sway-policy.html?_r=0.
89
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, PARTICIPANTS &
REGULATORS 24–26 (2016) (discussing how, over time, more supply-side users are professional suppliers);
RUDY TELLES JR., OFFICE OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ISSUE BRIEF #01-16, DIGITAL
MATCHING FIRMS: A NEW DEFINITION IN THE “SHARING ECONOMY” SPACE 5 (2016) (discussing how some
supply-side users are professionals).
90
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text; Stulberg, supra note 60, (citing a study that found that
almost half of Airbnb revenue in Los Angeles and Honolulu comes from full-time listings).
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is therefore more than “a people-to-people platform and a lifeline for people
who need supplemental income.”91 Likewise, other Platforms like EatWith—
which match diners and home chefs for meals—attract and sustain
professional, full-time supply-side users.92
ii. Platform Employees
Platforms utilize the microentrepreneur frame to classify their supply-side
users as independent contractors as opposed to employees.93 For example, on a
sign-up page for drivers, Uber stated: “Drive with Uber and earn great money
as an independent contractor. Get paid weekly just for helping our community
of riders get rides around town. Be your own boss and get paid in fares for
driving on your own schedule.”94 Uber’s spokesman confirmed that drivers are
“independent contractors” when he stated: “We don’t hire drivers. We’re a
technology company. We provide the app that they use, that connects
passengers with drivers. They have the flexibility of being their own boss.”95
By claiming that supply-side users are independent contractors, Uber avoids a
myriad of employment laws and liability for supply-side user harms.
However, the distinction between independent contractors and employees
for drivers is not as clear as Uber would like it to be. While drivers are flexible
as to when they can work, Uber does instruct drivers on many aspects of the
service, including the condition of the driver’s car,96 performance standards,97

91
Airbnb, No on Proposition F: A People-to-People Movement, (November 2015),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2504734-airbnb-prop-f-reduced.html.
92
For example, a search on the EatWith website for a dinner in Barcelona on February 24, 2017 yielded
eight results. Of those eight hosts, five hosted dinners ten or more times per month. See EATWITH,
https://www.eatwith.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
93
For an excellent discussion related to the distinction between independent contractors and employees
in the Sharing Economy, see Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to
Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53 (2015); see also Robert L. Redfearn III,
Sharing Economy Misclassification: Employees and Independent Contractors in Transportation Network
Companies, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1056 (2016) (arguing that “some Uber drivers should be classified
as independent contractors, while others should be classified as employees”).
94
Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, https://get.uber.com/p/legacy-cl-base/ (last visited Aug. 25,
2017).
95
Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring Controversy, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:53 PM),
http://www.news-press.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bring-controversy/15421511/.
96
See, e.g., Uber Vehicle Requirements Indianapolis, UBER https://www.uber.com/drive/indianapolis/
vehicle-requirements/ (describing the minimum requirements for the car such as model year and size) (last
visited Oct. 1, 2017).
97
Alex Rosenblat, The Truth About How Uber’s App Manages Drivers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 06,
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-manages-drivers (describing how Uber sets
performance targets for ride acceptances and cancellations).
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and payment terms.98 Uber can also deactivate drivers if their passenger ratings
fall below a particular target.99 Because control is the most important factor in
major tests for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors,
Uber drivers begin to look more like employees.100
Furthermore, while Uber claims that over half of its drivers worked for
Uber fewer than nine hours per week,101 much of its revenue comes from fulltime drivers.102 As UCLA law professor Noah Zatz points out, based on a
report written in part by an Uber executive, a “marginal group of full-time
drivers actually are doing about half the work, far more than those driving the
fewest hours.”103 These workers are likely to be economically dependent on
Uber for their livelihood, thereby satisfying the “economic realities” test used
by federal courts in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act.104
The classification of drivers as employees has been confirmed by several
governmental agencies,105 and courts have refused to find Uber and Lyft
drivers to be independent contractors as a matter of law.106 Regardless of
98

Id. (describing how Uber sets the rates for drivers).
Understanding Ratings, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/95002b97-6e18-45de-a9ac-b69413cca2ab
(last visited Nov. 2, 2016). See also Rosenblat, supra note 97.
100
See Gabrielle Wirth, Independent Contractor Classification, Westlaw Practical Law Practice Note 4503-3970 (2017) (describing the various tests for independent contractor classification including the control
test, the economic realities test, and the ABC test, all of which have control as a main factor).
99

101
Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber CEO: Most Drivers Work Too Little to Be Considered Full Time
Employees, FORTUNE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/21/travis-kalanick-part-time-drivers/
(“More than half of Uber’s drivers work nine hours or less per week.”).
102
See Noah Zatz, Is Uber Wagging the Dog with Its Moonlighting Drivers?, ON LAB. (Feb. 1, 2016),
https://onlabor.org/2016/02/01/is-uber-wagging-the-dog-with-its-moonlighting-drivers/.
103
Id.
104
Barlow v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 506 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The ‘economic realties’ test seeks to
look past technical, common-law concepts of the master and servant relationship to determine whether, as a
matter of economic reality, a worker is dependent on a given employer.”); Craig v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 75 (Kan. 2014) (holding the state’s answer binding); Anfinson v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 244 P.3d 32, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 281 P.3d 289, 293 (Wash. 2012).
105
See Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6 (Cal. Dep’t Labor
June 3, 2015) (finding that Uber drivers are employees of Uber because “Defendants hold themselves out as
nothing more than a neutral technological platform, designed simply to enable drivers and passengers to
transact the business of transportation” when “[t]he reality, however, is that Defendants are involved in every
aspect of the operation.”); ALJ’s Decision and Notice of Decision, Uber Techs, Inc., Docket No. 016-23858, at
*15 (N.Y. Dep’t of Labor June 9, 2017) (upholding determinations that Uber drivers were employees for the
purposes of unemployment insurance finding that Uber “exercised sufficient supervision and control over
substantial aspects of their work as Drivers”); Chris Roberts, Another Uber Driver Awarded Unemployment
Benefits, SF WEEKLY: THE SNITCH (Mar. 4, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/
2016/03/04/uber-driver-awarded-unemployment-benefits-first-known-case-in-state (stating that a former Uber
driver in California was classified as an employee for the purposes of unemployment benefits).
106
Doe v. Uber Techs, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp.
3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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whether a supply-side user is an employee or a full-fledged business, many of
the most profitable users for the Platform are not simply microentrepreneurs.
Classifying users as microentrepreneurs in name only allows businesses to
initially escape regulatory requirements, which is both unfair and dangerous.
c. The “Tech” Company Frame
Running in tandem with the microentrepreneur frame is the “tech”
company frame. By defining themselves by what they are not, (i.e., not
transportation, accommodation, food companies, etc.), Platforms seek to avoid
responsibility for compliance with a broad range of state and federal laws,107 as
well as any other harm caused by their transactions.108 Platforms claim they are
selling “access to the software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system
of reputation and trust between their users,” and not the services or assets

107
For example, in a memorandum of a voluntary agreement between Airbnb and the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing regarding housing law violations, Airbnb stated that it “provides
its services on a neutral basis to third-party users, [therefore] Airbnb cannot itself be held directly or
secondarily liable for the third-party users’ allegedly discriminatory conduct” because of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (described below). Voluntary Agreement at 5, Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v.
Airbnb, Inc., Nos. 574743-231889/574743-231624 (Apr. 19, 2017). In addition, Airbnb defended that it “has
not engaged in any conduct that violates” state antidiscrimination laws. Id.; see also Nancy Leong & Aaron
Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271,
1307 (2017) (arguing that laws should not immunize Platforms, although this remains an open question). In
addition, Uber unsuccessfully tried to get an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) case against it dismissed
by arguing that it is not a “public accommodation” under ADA’s “travel service” category. Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1076, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2015). This case was later
settled between the National Federation of the Blind of California and Uber, thus allowing Uber to avoid
classification, at this time, as a public accommodation under the ADA. Suevon Lee, Uber Settles ADA Suit
Over Treatment of Blind Riders, LAW360 (May 2, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
791427/uber-settles-ada-suit-over-treatment-of-blind-riders; see also Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws
Don’t Apply to Us, DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2015, 5:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/uber-disabilitylaws-dont-apply-to-us.
108
Uber and Airbnb disclaim all liability for harm in its terms of service. U.S. Terms of Use, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2017); Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.
airbnb.com/terms#sec17 (last visited Aug. 25, 2017). Furthermore, Airbnb continues to disclaim liability for
injuries at Airbnb properties. For example, a Canadian woman died in Taiwan because of carbon monoxide
poisoning during her stay; Airbnb settled with the woman’s family for “humanitarian reasons,” but said there
was “no basis for liability.” Zak Stone, Living and Dying on Airbnb, MEDIUM: MATTER (Nov. 8, 2015),
https://medium.com/matter/living-and-dying-on-airbnb-6bff8d600c04. Similarly, Uber has settled out of court
for injuries to passengers, but continues to disclaim liability. Bob Egelko, Uber May Be Liable for Accidents,
Even If Drivers Are Contractors, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:27 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/
article/Uber-may-be-liable-for-accidents-even-if-drivers-7377364.php; see also Agnieszka A. McPeak,
Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171, 176 (2016) (arguing that tort
liability should apply to Sharing Economy Platforms).
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themselves.109 As founder and former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick consistently
stated, Uber is a “technology platform that connects riders and drivers.”110
The tech company frame also allows Platforms to hide behind federal law
that immunizes Internet companies from liability for improper user behavior.
Based on their self-defined status as purely online actors, Platforms argue they
are interactive computer service providers (ICSP) under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which means they cannot “be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided” by users of their
Platforms.111
The CDA is a 1996 law originally motivated by a desire to encourage
ICSPs to moderate user-provided content without fear of being considered
“publishers” responsible for defamation claims112 and by a desire to halt efforts
by ICSPs to unjustifiably over-censor user content based on similar liability
concerns.113 However, over the decades since its enactment, it has been
broadly interpreted and has moved well beyond protecting ICSPs from liability
for defamation. Its immunity now protects ICSPs (broadly defined)114 from a
wide array of claims ranging from defamation to negligence.115

109

Lobel, supra note 15, at 100; see also SLEE, supra note 2, at 90–93.
Laurie Segall, Uber CEO: “Our Growth is Unprecedented,” CNN TECH (June 12, 2014, 8:32 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/12/technology/innovation/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick/; see also Jim Kerstetter,
Why Some Start-Ups Are Called Tech Companies and Others Are Not, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Aug. 2, 2015, 5:30
AM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/in-search-of-the-slippery-definition-of-the-modern-techcompany/?mcubz=3.
111
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). According to the CDA, an “interactive computer service provider” is “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server.” Id. § 230(f)(2). The law also provides immunity for liability that results from “any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider . . . considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Lobel,
supra note 15, at 145 (explaining that technology companies such as Uber and Airbnb “are arguing that they
fall under the definition of the Act, which thereby protects them from civil liability”).
112
Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of
Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 148 (2008) (describing how conservative members of congress were afraid
that intermediaries would have “a strong incentive to never exercise editorial control, thus increasing the risk
that children and others would be exposed to highly offensive or inappropriate Internet content”).
113
Id. (“Such over-censorship could ruin the Internet’s potential as a vibrant marketplace for the
exchange of ideas, as ideas that may offend even just one individual might be removed by an Internet
intermediary fearing litigation.”).
114
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that an ICSP can include “‘any’
information services or other systems, as long as the service or system allows ‘multiple users’ to access ‘a
computer server’”).
115
See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 653 n.58 (2014) (detailing
a thorough list of CDA cases).
110
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The CDA has been used by Platforms as a regulatory shield. For example,
based on Section 230 immunity, Airbnb convinced the City of Anaheim,
California not to impose penalties on the company for facilitating illegal
rentals.116 Airbnb also filed multiple lawsuits against regulations on short-term
rentals asserting that the CDA protects them.117 And Airbnb typically only
agrees to drop the lawsuits when the jurisdictions agree that the Platform will
not be held responsible for the illegal listings.118
The CDA could also be used as a shield against responsibility for harm
caused by Platform users. While Platforms have not directly asserted a CDA
defense in public litigation, many people, including the general counsel for
Lyft, are of the opinion that Platforms would or should be protected.119 For
example, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon argued that Uber should be
protected by the CDA so that it is not weighed down by a “barrage of liability
suits.”120 CDA immunity is powerful, and by framing themselves as mere
facilitators akin to other technology companies such as Facebook and eBay,
Platforms can attempt to avoid regulation and liability.

116
Lily Leung, Anaheim Won’t Fine Websites Like Airbnb for Illegal Short-Term Rental Listings,
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-726671-term-short.html
(quoting Anaheim City’s spokesperson Mike Lyster stating that “[a]fter considering federal communications
law, we won’t be enforcing parts of Anaheim’s short-term rental rules covering online hosting sites”).
117
Complaint at 1, 2, Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, et al., No. 1:16-CV-08239 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2016); see also Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-CV-6645 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 2, 2016).
118
Katie Benner, Airbnb Ends Fight with New York City over Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/technology/airbnb-ends-fight-with-new-york-city-over-fines.html;
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Airbnb’s Battle with San Francisco Shows the Payoff to Going Up Against Regulators,
WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/02/airbnbs-battlewith-san-francisco-shows-the-payoff-to-going-up-against-regulators/?utm_term=.145c528c201e.
119
See Keith St. Aubin, The Ride-Sharing Economy: Keeping Liability in the Rearview, ILL. BUS. L.J.
(Nov. 27, 2014), https://publish.illinois.edu/illinoisblj/2014/11/27/the-ride-sharing-economy-keeping-liabilityin-the-rearview/#_ftn9; Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye from Driver’s Hammer Attack. Could Uber
Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uberdriver-hammer-attack-liability/#563a0ef559ca; Stephanie Francis Ward, Internet Car Companies Offer
Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/internet_car_companies_offer_convenience_but_lawyers_see_caution_signs/.
120
Nancy Scola, Sen. Ron Wyden: Uber Should Be as Unfettered as Facebook, WASH. POST (July 10,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/10/sen-ron-wyden-uber-should-be-asunfettered-as-facebook/.
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d. The Self-Regulation Frame
According to Airbnb’s founder and CEO Brian Chesky, Sharing Economy
Platforms have these “magical things called reputation systems.”121 He argues
that these systems can screen out bad behavior better than governments can,
and that the “government should exist as the place of last recourse.”122 Uber
argues that its “rating system works to make sure that the most respectful riders
and drivers are using Uber.”123 Likewise, scholars like University of Chicago
law professor Lior Strahilevitz assert reputation systems create a “diminished
need for regulatory oversight and legal remedies because consumers [could]
police misconduct themselves.”124 Unfortunately, reputation systems have their
flaws and are not a perfect substitute for regulation.
The purpose of a reputation system is to allow users “to correctly infer the
likelihood” of a positive interaction without having any prior experience with
the user on the other side.125 Reputation systems rely on three basic
assumptions to predict future performance: “(1) reputation information
accurately represents the quality of past transactions; (2) the reputation system
cannot be manipulated by fraudulent reviews or irrelevant information; and (3)
users accurately interpret reputation information.”126 Each of these
assumptions may be at times incorrect, which “could lead consumers down
frustrating and potentially dangerous paths.”127
First, past transactions are often overly inflated. Approximately “95% of
Airbnb properties boast an average user-generated rating of either 4.5 or 5 stars
(the maximum).”128 Similarly, only 1% of Uber drivers receive below three

121
Jason Clampet, Airbnb CEO Responds to Illegal Rentals Story: “First of All, It’s Not Illegal
Everywhere,” SKIFT (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:00 AM), https://skift.com/2013/01/11/airbnb-responds-to-illegal-rentalsstory-first-of-all-its-not-illegal-everywhere/.
122
Id.
123
I Would Like to Know My Rating, UBER: HELP, https://help.uber.com/h/0539e772-747c-49a7-8c26f28c65e6f14d (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
124
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Less Regulation, More Reputation, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY 63, 71
(Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2011).
125
See Chris Nosko & Steven Tadelis, The Limits of Reputation in Platform Markets: An Empirical
Analysis and Field Experiment 34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20830, 2015).
126
Abbey Stemler, Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the Self-Regulation of the Sharing
Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 673, 687–88 (2017) (citing Nosko & Tadelis, supra note 125).
127
Stemler, supra note 126, at 688. For a complete discussion of how the reputation systems are flawed,
see id.
128
Georgios Zervas et al., A First Look at Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay Is Above
Average, 1, 2 (Apr. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2554500.
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stars (out of five).129 This over-inflation is likely to do with the personal nature
of Sharing Economy transactions, which trigger several well-documented
cognitive biases that inflate reviews.130 These biases include the reporting bias,
which causes people to provide reviews for extremely good transactions more
frequently than mediocre ones;131 the fear of retaliation, which causes people
to avoid giving negative reviews out of a fear that they will be punished;132 and
the herding effect, which causes people to provide inflated reviews if they see
prior positive reviews.133
Second, while Platforms take measures to prevent review manipulation, for
example by allowing only parties who have actually had an interaction to
review one another, confederate and other forms of fake reviews still exist on
Platforms.134 In addition, irrelevant information about the transaction or user
can make systems inaccurate. This irrelevant information can come in one of
two ways: (1) from external sources, such as an Uber passenger giving a fivestar review because the weather was nice and there was little traffic despite
poor service by a driver, or (2) from the algorithms that Platforms incorporate
into their reputation systems that analyze large swaths of user information.
These algorithms may utilize inputs that have nothing to do with the quality of
the user. For example, the neighborhood where a Lending Club applicant lives
may impair that applicant’s ability to get a loan despite her ability to pay.135
And finally, the way review information is presented can confuse users,
which can lead to inaccurate interpretations of review data.136 For example,
people tend to rely more on the overall score of a user (e.g., 4.7 stars out of 5)
than the weight of the score. This means a user with a 4.7 stars out of 5 based
on three reviews might be preferred by a user over an individual with 4.6 stars
based on three-hundred reviews.
Reputation systems are an excellent way to capture information about
transactions and encourage users to act responsibly. However, they are not
129
See Nairi, Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 24, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.
com/2014/04/feedback-is-a-2-way-street/.
130
Stemler, supra note 126, at 688–98.
131
Id. at 689; see also Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Charles A. Wood, The Sound of Silence in Online
Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias, 54 MGMT. SCI. 460, 474 (2008).
132
Stemler, supra note 126, at 691–92.
133
Lev Muchnik et al., Social Influence Bias: A Randomized Experiment, 341 SCI. 647, 649 (2013).
134
See Stemler, supra note 126, at 698–702.
135
Id. at 701; see CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3 (2016) (noting that algorithms may embed “human prejudice,
misunderstanding, and bias into the software systems”).
136
Stemler, supra note 126, at 702–03.
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without their faults. When reviews are overly positive, false, or difficult to
understand, the utility of reputation systems to self-regulate Platforms is
diminished. Therefore, regulators should not overly rely on the premise that
these systems can magically replace the need for various forms of regulation.
e. Innovation Frame
Similar to the self-regulation frame, Sharing Economy Platforms claim that
they are disrupting existing industries by offering new ways to solve
problems.137 This self-proclaimed positioning in the market allows them to
portray themselves as innovative and their competition as stagnant rent-seeking
incumbents.138 As the Washington Post opinion writer Roger Cohen writes,
“Uber manage[s] to cast itself as progress incarnate and the taxi industry as a
bunch of thick-headed peasants who didn’t know that its time had passed.”139
By emphasizing the newness of their business, Platforms avoid existing
regulations by distinguishing themselves from traditional firms140 and by
working with communities to develop novel and favorable regulations.141 As
stated by William Adkinson Jr., Attorney Advisor at the Federal Trade
Commission Office of Policy Planning, “It’s important that . . . regulations
permit peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms to flourish, because they represent

137
See Morgan Brown, Uber—What’s Fueling Uber’s Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS,
https://growthhackers.com/companies/uber/ (suggesting Uber is an example of a “truly disruptive idea[] that
completely redefine[s] an industry”); David Hantman, Opinion, The Push to Regulate the “Sharing Economy,”
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/the-push-to-regulate-the-sharingeconomy.html (writing in response to New York’s Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman’s op-ed, Uber’s
head of global public policy wrote that “New York has always been at the forefront of personal empowerment
and innovation, and we hope that leaders here recognize how troubling it would be to lag behind the rest of the
world”).
138
Driving Innovation at Uber, UBER (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.uber.com/en-PK/blog/innovation/
(“Innovation is in our DNA at Uber.”); SLEE, supra note 2, at 127.
139
Richard Cohen, Uber Mows Down Bill de Blasio, WASH. POST. (July 27, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/ubers-bare-knuckle-battle-against-the-taxi-industry/2015/07/27/e0e7be98-348311e5-8e66-07b4603ec92a_story.html?utm_term=.fac0e162c433.
140
Companies exploit legal gray areas to argue that existing rules do not apply to them. Pollman &
Barry, supra note 17, at 398–400 (“Even if existing regulations or statutes use broad language that, when read
literally, prohibit the company’s activity, the company can take the view that officials were not considering the
company’s activity when they wrote those rules—how could they, when the technology the business is built on
did not yet exist?”); see also Lobel, supra note 15, at 116 (describing an “overarching ethos of newness,
innovation, and empowerment” among Platform companies).
141
For example, the California Public Utilities Commission adopted a specific set of rules to govern
Transportation Network Company services to protect public safety while “encouraging innovation and
utilization of technology to better the lives of Californians.” Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Adopting
Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry:
Rulemaking No. 12-12-011 (July 30, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/
K112/77112285.PDF.
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one of the first real, purpose-built innovations in an industry that hasn’t seen
much innovation for decades.”142
Taken as a whole, the Myth of the Sharing Economy encourages people to
believe that the Sharing Economy is made up of self-regulating Platforms that
encourage microentrepreneurs to utilize their excess capacity in an altruistic
manner. As described in the next Part, the seductive appeal of this Myth allows
regulators to make sense of the novel, technology-driven business practices of
platforms, while preventing them from truly understanding the nature of these
companies and by extension how to regulate them.
II. DEMYSTIFYING THE MYTH
In the early stages of the Sharing Economy (roughly 2006 to 2014), most
jurisdictions simply let the issue of regulation play out.143 Survey reports from
2014 show that twenty-five of the thirty most populous cities in the United
States had yet to enact home-sharing regulations,144 and only thirteen of the
fifty most populous cities in the United States had taken action in the form of
cease-and-desist letters to stop ride-sharing apps (and in many places these
were ignored).145 The rest either turned a blind eye or began to implement
regulation tailored to the Platforms. While it is impossible to control for the
various variables that led to this hands-off regulatory approach, based on the
evidence provided in Part I, rhetoric clearly played a part.
Lack of regulation would not be a problem if the scale of the Sharing
Economy were not so large—that is if the Sharing Economy just consisted of
ordinary people sharing their “little bit” of excess capacity. However, we know
142
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Transcript of Sharing Economy Workshop 104 (June 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/public_events/636241/sharing_economy_workshop_transcript.pdf.
143
Katie Stancombe, Airbnb-Style Rentals Bill Moves Ahead to Indiana Senate, HERALD TIMES ONLINE
(Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/news/local/airbnb-style-rentals-bill-moves-ahead-toindiana-senate/article_8019e632-f33a-11e6-9bb8-6f43f166c41d.html (quoting Indiana State Representative
Matt Pierce).
144
NICOLE DUPUIS & BROOKS RAINWATER, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES CTR. FOR CITY SOLS. & APPLIED
RESEARCH, THE SHARING ECONOMY: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SENTIMENT SURROUNDING HOMESHARING
AND RIDESHARING 10–11 (2014) (listing the cities that either had policy interventions pending or took no
action towards home-sharing as of 2014).
145
ANDREW MOYLAN ET AL., R STREET INST., RIDESCORE 2014; HIRED DRIVER RULES IN U.S. CITIES 1,
3–4 (2014); see, e.g., Jeremy Allen, Uber, Lyft Ignore Ann Arbor’s Cease and Desist Demand; No Tickets
Issued Following City’s Orders, MLIVE (July 7, 2014, 9:57 AM) http://www.mlive.com/business/ann-arbor/
index.ssf/2014/07/uber_lyft_ignore_ann_arbors_ce.html; Ashley Dejean, Uber and Lyft Ignore Virginia’s
Demand to Cease and Desist, WAMU (June 6, 2014), http://wamu.org/story/14/06/06/uber_and_lyft_refuse_
virginias_demand_to_cease_and_desist/; see also DUPUIS & RAINWATER, supra note 144, at 10–11 (listing
thirteen cities that either had policy interventions pending or took no action towards ridesharing as of 2014).
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that the Sharing Economy is motivated by profit, not altruism. We know that
people are putting new capacity online, not simply utilizing what they already
have. And we know that many supply-side users are likely either employees or
full-fledged, illegal businesses, not microenterprises. The size and impact of
the Sharing Economy (mostly through its two main players, Airbnb and Uber)
present real harms to society. These harms manifest themselves as market
failures, which the following section surveys. The section concludes by
demonstrating how under-regulation of these market failures, has allowed a
few Platforms to grow exponentially.
A. Market Failures in the Sharing Economy
According to the public-interest theory of regulation, markets generally put
scarce resources to their highest and best use.146 However, regulatory
intervention may be necessary when the pricing system alone cannot
efficiently allocate resources.147 In these situations, market failures occur, and
in the Sharing Economy, in particular, they occur in two main ways—clean
and messy.148
1. Clean Market Failures
Clean market failures are those capable of being addressed quickly through
the design of Platforms and the internalization of costs. These market failures
include, but are not limited to: asymmetric information, discrimination, some
forms of negative externalities, and the provision of public goods.
Asymmetric information occurs when a party has exclusive information
about the quality of a transaction.149 Reputation systems help reduce
asymmetric information, but they can be improved to prevent the
disappointment and fraud that still occurs on platforms.150 For example,
146
See Susan Dudley et al., Economic Regulation: Price, Entry, and Exit, in REGULATION: A PRIMER 12
(Susan Dudley & Jerry Brito eds., 2d ed. 2012).
147
See Johan den Hertog, Review of Economic Theories of Regulation 1, 5 (Utrecht Sch. of Econ.
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Inst. Discussion Paper Series 10-18, Dec. 2010), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/
handle/1874/309815.
148
Similarly, in her 2016 article, Orly Lobel classifies regulatory challenges in the Platform Economy
into “easy” and “hard” cases. Lobel, supra note 15, at 93.
149
LALIT WANKHADE & BALAJI DABADE, QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND PERCEPTION 14 (2010).
150
See, e.g., David Pope, Ways to Prevent Sharing Economy Fraud, TNOOZ (July 18, 2016),
https://www.tnooz.com/article/ways-to-prevent-sharing-economy-fraud/ (describing various frauds in the
sharing economy); see also Airbnb Guest Stories, AIRBNBHELL, http://www.airbnbhell.com/airbnb-gueststories (last visited Aug. 24, 2017); Airbnb Host Stories, AIRBNBHELL, http://www.airbnbhell.com/airbnbhost-stories/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2017); Airbnb Reviews, TRUSTPILOT, https://www.trustpilot.com/review/
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regulators could require platforms to simultaneously reveal feedback. Under
such a system, feedback would only be available after both users provide it or
after a set period of time. Thus, the fear of retaliation would be reduced and
reviews would be more accurate.
Discrimination occurs throughout the Sharing Economy.151 For example,
Airbnb guests with African-American sounding names are significantly less
likely to have a reservation request accepted than guests with white-sounding
names.152 To reduce discrimination, Airbnb now encourages instant booking so
hosts cannot review reservation requests.153 Other design choices, such as
reducing the prominence of pictures and names, can be used to further reduce
discrimination by removing opportunities to make decisions based on
discriminatory characteristics.
Regulations can also force Platforms to internalize many of the costs they
have avoided, especially those related to ensuring safety via direct and
vicarious liability.154 California law, for example, requires transportation
network companies (TNC) to have a zero-tolerance policy for drunk driving.155
If a drunk-driving complaint is received by a TNC, it must suspend the driver
until further investigation.156 When TNCs do not comply, they face fines.157
Furthermore, if tort liability is shifted to Platforms while users are using
www.airbnb.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). Note that the complaints on www.AirbnbHell.com are
unverified.
151
See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a
Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J., Apr. 2017, at 1, 2; Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy,
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2016) (discussing gender discrimination in the Sharing Economy). See
generally NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY & ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS
(2017) (surveying how Sharing Economy users may experience discrimination).
152
Edelman et al., supra note 151, at 1–3.
153
Sage Lazzaro, 9 Things Airbnb Is Now Doing to Prevent Hosts from Discriminating Against Renters,
OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:23 PM), http://observer.com/2016/09/9-things-airbnb-is-now-doing-to-preventhosts-from-discriminating-against-renters/.
154
Injuries occur in the Sharing Economy. E.g., Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft,
WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017);
Ron Lieber, Death in Airbnb Rental Raises Liability Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/your-money/death-in-airbnb-rental-raises-liability-questions.html?_r=0
(discussing safety and insurance questions in the Sharing Economy). Note that the ride-sharing incidents list is
compiled by the Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association, which is opposed to ridesharing. About,
WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/about (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
155
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 141, at 3.
156
Id. at 27. For another example of a state zero-tolerance policy, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.748 (West
2017).
157
In April 2017, the California Public Utilities Commission recommended assessing Uber over $1.3
million for over 150 violations of the zero-tolerance rules. Order Instituting Investigation and Order to Show
Cause Why the Commission Should Not Impose Appropriate Fines and Sanctions on Rasier-CA LLC at 1,
No. I.17-04-009 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 6, 2017).
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Platform services, Platforms will have a greater incentive to prevent harms
through broader background checks and safety inspections.
Each year, Platforms avoid reporting and collecting millions of dollars in
tax revenues to all levels of government.158 Consequently, public goods such as
roads, parks, and law enforcement may be underfunded. However, as
suggested by the fact that Airbnb remits over $110 million in taxes in over 200
jurisdictions, Platforms can collect taxes with relative ease.159
While clean market failures within the Sharing Economy are more
straightforward to address than messy market failures, regulation has still been
piecemeal.160 Thus unsurprisingly, consumers have been defrauded,
discriminated against, and injured within the sharing economy, and taxes,
which finance public goods, have gone unpaid.
2. Messy Market Failures
Messy market failures are far harder to address than clean market failures.
This is because some of these market failures are ambiguous and not readily
apparent (e.g., environmental and community harms); some must be addressed
beyond the local level of government (e.g., privacy harms); and others may be
indirect (e.g., economic harms).
a. Ambiguous Harms
While Platforms present themselves as good community members and ecofriendly businesses, they can cause unintended yet broad harms to communities
and the environment. For example, accommodation Platforms’ disregard for
zoning and licensing requirements can go well beyond nuisance harms, as

158
See ZACH SCHILLER & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX & ECON. POLICY, TAXES AND THE ON-DEMAND
ECONOMY 2–3 (2017).
159
AIRBNB POLICY TOOL CHEST, supra note 6, at 4.
160
See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147,
184–94 (2016) (describing current regulations of the Sharing Economy); Pollman & Barry, supra note 17, at
398–400; Andrew J. Hawkins, Massachusetts Becomes the First State to Tax Uber and Lyft, VERGE (Aug. 22,
2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/22/12585976/massachusetts-uber-lyft-tax-taxi-ride-hail
(reporting that Uber is also beginning to collect taxes); Stancombe, supra note 143. Airbnb does collect taxes
for some jurisdictions that have reached an agreement with the company. As of December of 2016, Airbnb
claims it has collected and remitted more than $110 million in taxes for over 200 jurisdictions. AIRBNB POLICY
TOOL CHEST, supra note 6, at 4. See also Leigh Gallagher, Airbnb’s Profits to Top $3 Billion by 2020,
FORTUNE (Feb. 15, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/02/15/airbnb-profits/ (noting that Airbnb’s
projected revenues in 2017 are $2.8 billion, which shows that the amount Airbnb collects in taxes is
underwhelming).
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demonstrated by the horror stories listed on sites like www.AirbnbHell.com.161
They can impact the affordability of housing162 and the culture of
communities.163
The environmental impacts associated with the Sharing Economy are
equally complex. Despite widespread beliefs that the Sharing Economy is
reducing the demand for new goods and spaces, apart from research on carsharing, there is no empirical evidence that these beliefs are true.164 To the
contrary, a study by Rayle et al. interviewed two groups of people in three
neighborhoods in San Francisco: (1) individuals who had just completed a ride
with Uber/Lyft and (2) individuals who had used Uber/Lyft within the previous
two weeks.165 They asked, among other things, how the individual would have
traveled had Uber/Lyft not been available.166 They found a small “(8%)
induced travel effect,” suggesting that the presence of Uber/Lyft leads to rides
that would otherwise not have taken place.167 Furthermore, for those who
would have made the trip in the absence of Uber/Lyft, 33% of respondents said
that they would have used a bus or rail, which are typically more
environmentally friendly forms of transportation.168
As for anticompetitive behavior, problems arise in two main respects: the
concentration of power among Platforms and the coordination of prices. First,
with Internet-based activities and networked technology, competition is far
161
Although, nuisance harms are also real. See, e.g., Lara Williams, When Airbnb Renters Turn Into
Nuisance Neighbours, GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2016, 5:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
sep/17/airbnb-nuisance-neighbours-tribunal-ruling.
162
See, e.g., Stephen Sheppard & Andrew Udell, Do Airbnb Properties Affect House Prices?, WILLIAMS
COLLEGE 29–30 (Oct. 30, 2016), http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/SheppardUdellAirbnbAffectHouse
Prices.pdf (finding a correlation between Airbnb listings and home values in New York City).
163
Neringa Sinkeviciute, Tourism Boom in Barcelona: Strengthening the Economy or Troubling Local
Residents?, CATALAN NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 7, 2014, 3:29 PM), http://www.catalannews.com/life-style/item/
tourism-boom-in-barcelona-strengthening-the-economy-or-troubling-local-residents (describing the impact of
Airbnb rentals on neighborhoods in Barcelona, Spain).
164
Unlike ride-sharing, car-sharing involves either renting a car from a peer or from an app as opposed
to a centralized rental office. With car-sharing, substantial reductions in CO2 emissions have been documented.
See HANS NIJLAND ET AL., PBL NETH. EVNTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, IMPACT OF CAR SHARING ON MOBILITY
AND CO2 EMISSIONS 1, 10–11 (July 2015); Eliot Martin et al., Impact of Carsharing on Household Vehicle
Holdings: Results from North American Shared-Use Vehicle Survey, 2143 TRANSP. RES. REC. 150, 150 (2010)
(demonstrating that households participating in car-sharing programs “reduce their vehicle holdings to a
degree that is statistically significant”).
165
Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips
and User Characteristics in San Francisco 6–7 (Nov. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
University of California Transportation Center).
166
Id. at 6–12.
167
Id. at 13.
168
Id.
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from a simple “click away.”169 As described below, the network and data
network effects will only allow a few players to emerge in each modality, thus
competition is limited.170 Second, Platforms, like Uber, are able to unilaterally
set prices (including surge prices) for all supply-side users. These activities
have been challenged as unreasonable restraints on trade under the Sherman
Act,171 but are yet to be resolved because Uber now insists on submitting the
dispute to arbitration.172
How regulators should address the harms caused by the Sharing Economy
to the vibrancy and diversity of communities, the environment, and markets is
a very open question, primarily because we have yet to see how those harms
will manifest over time.
b. Beyond Local Regulation
Certain market failures are inappropriate for purely local regulation. For
example, due in large part to their classification as independent contractors,
which reduces employment security and benefits, many Sharing Economy
workers are part of a “precariat class.”173 Local jurisdictions alone cannot
provide for the social services to aid these workers in times of need or when
they relocate.
Furthermore, because Platforms connect people from different places,
gather large amounts of user data, and store information remotely, harms
related to privacy are magnified across borders. Currently, Platforms use
contract law to dictate privacy protections, or lack thereof, but abuse still
occurs.174 To illustrate, there were widespread reports that Uber shared access

169

FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
(2015).
170
Id. (arguing that alternatives to dominate players are “demonstrably worse” as the dominate players’
“self-reinforcing data advantage grows”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 89, at 25–29 (describing
competition issues in the Sharing Economy); JOÃO E. GATA, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L, THE SHARING
ECONOMY, COMPETITION AND REGULATION 1, 4–6 (2015).
171
Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), motion for partial reconsideration
denied, 185 F. Supp. 3d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
172
Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated sub nom. Meyer v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
173
GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 24 (2011); TREBOR SCHOLZ,
UBERWORKED AND UNDERPAID: HOW WORKERS ARE DISRUPTING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 129–30 (2017).
174
Sabreena Khalid, Privacy Concerns in the Sharing Economy: The Case of Uber, JOLT DIGEST (Dec.
16, 2014), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy-concerns-in-the-sharing-economy-the-case-of-uber.
AND INFORMATION 83
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to its “God View” with attendees of a launch event.175 The God View showed
the whereabouts of notable users.176 In response, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) stepped in and filed a complaint against Uber, asserting
that the company violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”177 Uber and the FTC later settled,178 but still the program
demonstrates how technology companies have the ability to decimate
individual privacy and why the response to privacy harms cannot be
piecemeal.
c. Indirect Harms
When the Sharing Economy first took off, the economic effects were
expected to be incredibly positive, and to some degree they have been.179 A
recent study using almost fifty million individual-level observations of Uber
riders estimated that the service generated approximately $6.8 billion in
consumer surplus in the United States in 2015, meaning that consumers are
enjoying a large degree of the value created by the service.180 However, “the
distribution of increased income and welfare are likely to be uneven.”181 This
is in no small part because supply-side users are more likely affluent to begin
with (they are the ones who already have fancy cars and second homes next to
beautiful beaches).182 The Sharing Economy simply gives this group the ability
to make more off of what they have or invest in new assets to make even more
money, a process identified as the “Piketty-effect” of the Sharing Economy.183
175
Kashmir Hill, “God View” Uber Allegedly Stalked Users for Party-Goers’ Viewing Pleasure,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/god-view-uberallegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-pleasure/#117e63d83141.
176
Id.
177
Complaint at 6, In re Uber Techs., Inc. (F.T.C. 2017) (No. C-); see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
178
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Uber Settles FTC Allegations That It Made Deceptive Privacy and Data
Security Claims (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/08/uber-settles-ftcallegations-it-made-deceptive-privacy-data.
179
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 26, at 14 (projecting that the Sharing Economy could be
worth $335 billion in global revenue by 2025).
180
Peter Cohen et. al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016), https://cbpp.georgetown.edu/sites/cbpp.georgetown.edu/
files/ConsumersurplusatUber_PR.PDF.
181
Koen Frenken & Juliet Schor, Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective, 23 ENVTL.
INNOVATION SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 3, 7 (2017). Contra Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-toPeer Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=25743374 (finding below-median income consumers are able to disproportionately benefit from the
Sharing Economy).
182
Frenken & Schor, supra note 181. Contra Fraiberger & Sundarajan, supra note 181.
183
Frenken & Schor, supra note 181. Contra Fraiberger & Sundarajan, supra note 181. See generally
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In the end, it is predicted that the wealthier supply-side users will crowd out
the work opportunities typically completed by lower-educated, manual
laborers.184
Existing firms and their employees are also likely to experience lower
earnings in response to the public’s desire to take advantage of lower-cost
transactions in the Sharing Economy.185 One study found that the revenue of
hotels in Texas reduced significantly as Airbnb grew in that state.186 Another
found that in New York City, traditional cab rides were reduced by 2.1 million
rides in the same time period that the number of Uber rides jumped from
300,000 to 3.5 million.187 While it is not the role of government to protect
existing industries at the expense of innovation, new firms must not be allowed
to unfairly escape all forms of costly regulation.
Messy regulatory failures will require open and thoughtful debate to
address, but as demonstrated below, because Platforms are relatively
unregulated in the startup stages, network effects will allow a few to grow very
powerful. These powerful firms will then use their vast arsenal of users and
cash to avoid addressing both clean and messy market failures.
B. The Breeding Grounds for Unicorns
The Sharing Economy appears to present a diverse set of Platforms—from
clothes sharing to pet sitting—but this is not an entirely accurate picture. In
reality, the Sharing Economy is mostly comprised of only a few firms.188 And
despite popular belief, the Sharing Economy as a whole is not growing by
leaps and bounds. Yes, there has been an incredible influx of Uber-like
businesses receiving venture capital investments, but the true success stories of
the Sharing Economy are few and far between.189

THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ. Press
2014).
184
Juliet B. Schor, Does the Sharing Economy Increase Inequality Within the Eighty Percent?: Findings
from a Qualitative Study of Platform Providers, 10 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y 263, 270 (2017).
185
Frenken & Schor, supra note 181, at 6.
186
Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the
Hotel Industry (Boston Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.
187
Casey Leins, Who’s a Sharing Economy Worker?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: DATA MINE (Aug. 21,
2015, 1:49 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/08/21/uber-airbnb-etsy-who-are-thesharing-economy-workers.
188
SLEE, supra note 2, at 24.
189
As of 2015, $12 billion had been invested in the Sharing Economy, which is twice the amount social
networking Facebook and Twitter had received. Luke Zobrist & Michael Grampp, The Sharing Economy:
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Tracking the 154 companies identified on Jeremiah Owyang’s (founder of
the brand council Crowd Companies) master list of Sharing Economy
companies in 2013,190 fewer than 60% of those companies survived until
2016.191 Of those, fewer than ten were still functioning as successful, standalone companies with a value of over $1 million in 2016. Over twenty-five
were acquired, and the rest have experienced a minimal amount of success or
failure.
Many academic papers about the Sharing Economy mention other Sharing
Economy Platforms such as TaskRabbit,192 HomeJoy,193 and DogVacay,194
without delving into great detail about the companies themselves because they
have only seen limited success, if they have seen success at all. The network
and data network effects can, in part, explain this phenomenon. A standard
network effect involves a situation in which a service becomes more valuable
the more people use it.195 Credit card companies are a well-known example;
the more people who use a particular card (American Express, Visa, etc.), the
more sellers will begin to accept that card and the more buyers will, in turn,
use that card more often.196 The same principle applies to the Sharing
Share and Make Money: How Does Switzerland Compare 3, DELOITTE (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/consumer-business/ch-cb-shared-economy-share-and-make-money.pdf;
see also SLEE, supra note 2, at 88–101. The venture capital investment trend may be slowing. Leslie Hook,
Venture Capital Starts to Tune Out of On-Demand Services, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016, 3:51 PM),
https://www.ft.com/content/88fb17c2-da12-11e5-98fd-06d75973fe09.
190
Jeremiah Owyang, The Master List of the Collaborative Economy: Rent and Trade Everything, WEBSTRATEGIST (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2013/02/24/the-master-list-of-thecollaborative-economy-rent-and-trade-everything. Certain companies on Owyang’s list of 200 Sharing
Economy companies, were not tracked. This is because these companies did not appear to be capitalizing on
the excess capacity of microentrepreneurs and thus did not appear to be Sharing Economy companies.
Examples include commercial car rental services such as Car2Go and textbook, fashion, and art rental
companies. Furthermore, there was no available data for several of the companies. Therefore, they were
excluded.
191
Jeremiah Owyang is the founder of the brand council Crowd Companies and an active writer about
the Sharing Economy. See About Jeremiah Owyang, WEB-STRATEGIST, http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/
about/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
192
TaskRabbit is a Platform that allows users to outsource small jobs, such has grocery shopping and
home repairs, to others. See About Us, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/about (last visited Sep. 3,
2017).
193
HomeJoy was a cleaning company that shut down in 2015. Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy?
It Couldn’t Hold On to Its Customers, FORBES (July 23, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers/#1b09eca3114c.
194
See How It Works, ROVER, https://www.rover.com/become-a-sitter/ (explaining that DogVacay was a
pet-sitting service provider that recently merged with Rover, a dog-sitting service provider) (last visited Sept.
3, 2017).
195
See Matt Turck, The Power of Data Network Effects, MATTTURCK (Jan. 4, 2016), http://mattturck.
com/the-power-of-data-network-effects/.
196
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EURO. ECON.
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Economy: competition is reduced because the more people use a particular
Platform, the more people want to use that Platform.
Furthermore, data network effects work in a similar way. The more users
that provide data to a system, the more efficient the system becomes, typically
through machine learning.197 Sharing Economy platforms have benefited
enormously from the data network effect to provide a seamless user experience
via fine-tuned matching algorithms and iterative quality improvements.198
Thus, compounding these network effects is the fact that dominant Sharing
Economy firms often acquire their competition or prospective competition.199
For example, Trip4Real, a Platform that allows users to connect with locals
(for a fee) for events like tours, cooking classes, and photo shoots, was
acquired by Airbnb in 2016.200 And in China there was a heated battle in the
ride-sharing space between Didi Chuxing and Uber China. Uber China
ultimately sold to Didi Chuxing due to the winner-takes-all nature of
Platforms.201
The limited success enjoyed by the vast majority of Sharing Economy
Platforms is also likely because self-interest drives business. Successful
Sharing Economy startups are often “those that get in early” and appeal to
“consumers’ laziness and desire to save money [rather] than their actual desire
to share and be green.”202 As a result, the companies built around sharing tools,
bikes, cars, and pets are usually more hassle than they are worth for
consumers. The Sharing Economy is not a wide-open realm of opportunity;
thus, we must observe the Unicorns carefully in order to regulate them, paying
more attention to what they do than what they say.
ASS’N 990, 1013 (2003).
197
Turck, supra note 195.
198
Bruno Carballa Smichowski, Data as a Common in the Sharing Economy: A General Policy
Proposal 15, 19 (Centre d’économie de l’Université Paris Nord, Working Paper No. 2016-10, 2016),
https://vecam.org/IMG/pdf/carballa_smichowski_bruno_2016_-_data_as_a_common_in_the_sharing_
economy_a_general_policy_proposal_cepn_wp_.pdf. See generally Bjarke Staun-Olsen, What You Need to
Know About Network Effects, MEDIUM: CREANDUM (Dec. 23, 2016), https://medium.com/creandumfamily/what-you-need-to-know-about-network-effects-b7f594d7b011#.huvj6b6xw.
199
See Acquisitions in Sharing Economy, INDEX BY TNW, https://index.co/market/sharing-economy/
acquisitions (providing a comprehensive list of Sharing Economy acquisitions) (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
200
Natasha Lomas, Airbnb Acquires Travel Activities Marketplace, Trip4real, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19,
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/19/airbnb-acquires-travel-activities-marketplace-trip4real/.
201
Lulu Yilun Chen, Uber Might Have the Last Laugh Over China, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2016, 4:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-14/uber-s-kalanick-might-have-last-laugh-amidnew-chinese-rules.
202
See Catherine Clifford, Is the Sharing Economy High Over?, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/271692.

STEMLER_GALLEYPROOFS2

2017]

12/22/2017 9:45 AM

THEY MYTH OF THE SHARING ECONOMY

231

III. UNICORN MAGIC: HOW SHARING ECONOMY PLATFORMS MAKE THEIR
OWN RULES
As demonstrated in the Parts above: Sharing Economy firms use rhetoric to
avoid regulation. Some grow powerful, and those dominant players, the
Unicorns, work their magic to fend off burdensome regulation and write their
own rules. This Part describes how Unicorns accomplish their particular form
of “magic.”
Unicorns are able to avoid regulation and dictate the rules that will govern
them in traditional and nontraditional ways. On the traditional side, once the
Unicorns acquire venture capital and begin generating revenue, they can buy
advertising, armies of lobbyists, and commission studies from prominent
politicians and academics to write favorable reports in support of their
activities.203 For example, as of 2014, Uber had at least a third more lobbyists
than Wal-Mart (not including municipal lobbyists).204 Uber’s founder and
former CEO, Travis Kalanick once said, “[W]e are running a political
campaign and the Candidate is Uber. . . . And this political race is happening in
every major city in the world. And because this isn’t about a democracy, this is
about a product, you can’t win 51 to 49. You have to win 98 to 2.”205
Perhaps more concerning than Unicorns’ capacity to flex their muscles
through spending, however, is their ability to outmuscle and outsmart
governments by mobilizing their powerful user base.206 For example, when
two bills that would toughen ride-sharing requirements were proposed in
203
See Donald McNeill, Governing a City of Unicorns: Technology Capital and the Urban Politics of
San Francisco, 37 URB. GEOGRAPHY 494, 496 (2016) (describing lobbying efforts by Airbnb and Uber);
Codagnone et al., supra note 16, at 33 (“[B]oth Airbnb and Uber commissioned reports by influential
academics, who had formerly held important governmental posts: (a) Gene Sperling was a White House
Economic Advisor; (b) Alan Krueger was formerly Chairman of President Barack Obama’s Council of
Economic Advisers; (c) Justus Haucap, was formerly Chairman of the German Monopolies Commission.”).
For an excellent discussion about the role of regulatory affairs in startups who, as part of their business model,
must disrupt current regulatory regimes, see Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative
Startups, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, (D. Gordon Smith &
Christine Hurt, eds., forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880818.
204
Karen Weise, This Is How Uber Takes Over a City, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 23, 2015,
6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city.
205
Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/
12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy.
206
Matt Stempeck, Are Uber and Facebook Turning Users Into Lobbyists?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 11,
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/are-uber-and-facebook-turning-users-into-lobbyists; see also Pollman & Barry,
supra note 17, at 403–06; Rosalind S. Helderman, Uber Pressures Regulators by Mobilizing Riders and Hiring
Vast Lobbying Network, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/uberpressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-and-hiring-vast-lobbying-network/2014/12/13/3f4395c6-7f2a-11e49f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html.
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California, Lyft used a company called Phone2Action to send e-mails and
manipulate the Lyft interface to help people contact their elected officials.207
From e-mails alone, Lyft was able to get a staggering 28% conversion rate
(compared to the normal 2% response rate for advocacy e-mails).208 The bills
either failed or were modified to the ride sharing company’s satisfaction.209
Platforms advocate hard by utilizing atypical yet effective tactics ranging
from Twitter campaigns to ice cream deliveries as a way of pressuring cities to
adopt industry-friendly regulations.210 For example, when New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio proposed legislation that would limit the number of ridesharing vehicles in the City, Uber responded by adding a “de Blasio” mode to
its app.211 The mode showed users the long wait times and car unavailability
they would be subject to if the legislation passed.212 The company’s gambit
succeeded and the City stopped pursuing the cap proposal.213
This new form of “Platform advocacy” or “new power” allows large
groups to collectively influence lawmakers.214 Platforms are masters at
harnessing and nurturing that power. The problem, however, is
oversimplification. By controlling the terms of engagement and frames,
Sharing Economy companies do not seek to facilitate debate around nuanced
and emerging issues. Their self-interest inspires them to present the same onesided narratives used to influence regulators, and their user base gets behind
that message, even if they are ultimately hurt by the hands-off regulatory
approach.

207

Said, supra note 60.
Id.
209
Id.
210
Edward T. Walker, Opinion, The Uber-ization of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/opinion/the-uber-ization-of-activism.html (describing how Uber
delivered ice cream in Portland when it was not allowed to operate); Weise, supra note 204.
211
Amanda Schupak, Uber App Mocks New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2015,
4:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/uber-app-mocks-new-york-city-mayor-de-blasio/; Fitz Tepper, Uber
Launches “De Blasio’s Uber” Feature in NYC with 25-Minute Wait Times, TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/16/uber-launches-de-blasios-uber-feature-in-nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times/.
212
Schupak, supra note 211; Tepper, supra note 211.
213
Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Administration Dropping Plan for Uber Cap, for Now, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administration-dropping-plan-foruber-cap-for-now.html. For additional examples of platform advocacy, see Pollman & Barry, supra note 17, at
403–06.
214
Said, supra note 56 (describing “new power”); Stempeck, supra note 206 (“New startup delivers a
creative and delightful new service which breaks the old rules, ignoring those rules until they have [a] critical
mass of happy customers; regulators and incumbents respond by trying to shut down the new innovation;
startups and their happy users rain hellfire on the regulators; questions arise about the actual impact of the new
innovation; a tiny amount of data is shared to settle the dispute. Rinse and repeat, over and over.”).
208
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Furthermore, if regulations are imposed, Unicorns will work to make sure
the regulations are not overly burdensome, preferring to pull out of a
jurisdiction rather than submit to a series of regulations that address clean and
messy market failures.215 This is clear in the many jurisdictions that recognize
Uber and Lyft as transportation network companies and have adopted specific,
although light-in-touch, ordinances for them.216 As reporter Karen Weise puts
it, “Each government, whether municipal or state, goes through its own process
to craft rules, but in the end, officials generally codify the insurance coverage,
background-check policies, and inspection protocols Uber [and Lyft] already
have in place. Uber makes the rules; cities fall in line.”217
The same is true for Airbnb. In the jurisdictions where the Platform is
regulated, special rules have been crafted to treat the industry differently than
traditional hotels.218 Airbnb has even produced a thirty-plus page “Tool Chest”
for regulators to make sure any regulations are “smart,” with the implied
understanding that it is considered “smart” to allow “home sharing” to
flourish.219 However, other than tax collection, few jurisdictions place legal
responsibility on Airbnb for facilitating illegal rentals.220
IV. LESSONS FROM THE SHARING ECONOMY “REVOLUTION”

215
In Austin, for example, Uber and Lyft pulled operations from the city for over a year in response to
regulation requiring fingerprinting of drivers as a part of their background check. Andrew Liptak, Lyft and
Uber Will Return to Austin on Monday, VERGE (May 27, 2017, 3:43 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/
27/15705060/lyft-uber-returning-austin-texas-fingerprinting-requirements; see also Daniel E. Rauch & David
Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing
Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 945 (2015) (“Because they create mass producer and consumer surplus,
sharing firms can generate the same sorts of mass popular support that often accompany pushes for stadiums.
Indeed, while sharing firms do not have sports teams’ ability to threaten exit to extract gains, they do have the
capacity to rally ‘fans’ for political gain.”).
216
Map of State-Level Ridesharing Laws, R STREET INST., http://www.rstreet.org/tnc-map/ (last updated
June 1, 2016).
217
Weise, supra note 204.
218
A 2016 report conducted by R Street Institute, a libertarian think tank, found that twenty-one of the
fifty-nine major U.S. cities analyzed had some sort of tailored legal framework that recognized short-term
rentals and provided a foundation for their operation. ANDREW MOYLAN, R STREET INST., ROOMSCORE 2016:
SHORT-TERM RENTAL REGULATION IN U.S. CITIES 5 (March 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.pdf.
219
AIRBNB POLICY TOOL CHEST, supra note 6, at 3–4.
220
Even in San Francisco, which tried to place responsibility on homesharing platforms for facilitating
illegal rentals, came to a special agreement with Airbnb. See supra note 117. See generally Talia G. Loucks,
Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 329 (2015); Johanna
Interian, Note, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 129 (2016); Dana Palombo, Comment, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to
Incorporate Short-Term Residential Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287 (2015).
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Rhetoric has driven regulatory agendas throughout history—from
securities regulation to gun control and tax law.221 In the Sharing Economy, it
is no different, especially in the formative stages. Successful Sharing Economy
Platforms have learned how to employ rhetoric to avoid the expense of
ensuring safety, providing universal access, and treating supply-side users as
employees, among other things. However, what makes this application of
rhetoric most concerning is the concentration of power inherent in these firms.
By ignoring the rules that would traditionally govern their activities, Platforms
can grow more and more powerful.222 Therefore, regulators need to heed the
following lessons to effectively regulate future network technologies.
A. Acknowledge the Knowledge Gap Between the Regulators and the
Regulated
In modern times, there is a growing knowledge gap between the regulated
and the regulators. Sharing Economy companies, in particular, utilize
sophisticated Internet-based technologies that regulators are at a loss to fully
understand, much less question. Regulators need to acknowledge their lack of
expertise and bring industry stakeholders to the table to better understand the
nature of these new businesses.
Regulators may be well served to see through the rhetoric, address the
technology gap, and encourage innovation by embracing the principles of the
New Governance theory.223 New Governance principles encourage an open
and meaningful dialogue between industry and government to identify the
goals of regulation and empower industry and other stakeholders to determine

221
See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation
of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619 (2010) (discussing the impact of rhetoric on the Security
and Exchange Commission’s deregulation of foreign private issuers); Daniel M. Filler, Random Violence and
the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate, 86 VA. L. REV. 1095 (2000) (reviewing JOEL BEST,
RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS (1999) (discussing the role of
rhetoric in shaping gun control policy after the Columbine shootings)); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric
of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987)
(discussing the use of rhetoric to shape tax policy).
222
Society has seen this pattern before. For example, Amazon avoided sales tax for many years, which
gave at a significant advantage over “brick-and-mortar” stores. Amelia Landenberger, How Battles over
Collection of Sales Taxes on Online Sales Will Affect Small Businesses—Especially Affiliates of Large Sellers
Like Amazon.com, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 225, 225 (2012).
223
Other scholars including this Article’s author have encouraged the use of New Governance principles
to help regulate the Sharing Economy. See Brescia, supra note 15, at 91 (describing how the legal profession
leans on New Governance approaches to regulate it, and applies those same principles of New Governance
theory to propose ways to regulate the Sharing Economy); Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of
New Governance and Lex Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87 (2016).
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ways to best achieve those goals.224 As soon as regulators become aware of
new innovations, especially those that rely on network effects, they should
encourage key stakeholders to come to the table and begin a dialogue early
about potential regulatory problems and solutions. Coming quickly up to speed
about new business models will allow regulators to more easily see past
rhetoric and prevent market failures.
B. Be Not Afraid of the CDA
The CDA has been credited as the law that helped the “revolutionary
growth” of the Internet because it removed the threat of litigation resulting
from third-party behavior.225 Without the protection of the CDA, it is unlikely
that we would have robust platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter.226
However, regulators should not self-censor when it comes to the CDA. There
is a growing body of scholarship and case law that suggests the CDA as it
applies to the Sharing Economy may not completely immunize it from liability
for user behavior or prevent it from being regulated.227
One case in particular, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, may signal
the beginning of the end for broad CDA immunity. In 2015, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors adopted a city ordinance, known as the “Airbnb Law.”228
The Airbnb Law was so named because it was tailored to support the platform

224
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1623 (2001) (arguing that New Governance principles are necessary because
regulatory issues “have become too complex for government to handle on its own, because disagreements exist
about the proper ends of public action, and because government increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its
will on other crucial actors without giving them a meaningful seat at the table”).
225
Jeff Kosseff, The Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet: Section 230’s Evolution
Over Two Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2016).
226
Kosseff, supra note 225.
227
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008); Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016);
see Adeline A. Allen, Uber and the Communications Decency Act: Why the Ride-Hailing App Would Not Fare
Well Under § 230, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 290, 293–95 (2017) (arguing that Uber is ineligible for Section 230
immunity because it heavily controls interactions between users and thus provides content to the platform); see
also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 493 (2010)
(finding that the CDA fails as a defense approximately a third of the time); Internet Firms’ Legal Immunity Is
Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21716661-platformshave-benefited-greatly-special-legal-and-regulatory-treatment-internet-firms.
228
See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 41A, §§ 41A.5(e), 41.A5(g)(4)(C)–(D), 41A.7(b)(1)–(3) (2017); see
also Katie Benner, Airbnb in Disputes with New York and San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/technology/airbnb-sues-san-francisco-over-a-law-it-had-helped-pass.
html.
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and it requires hosts renting out their entire homes to register with the city.229
However, more than a year after the law took effect, only 25% of Airbnb hosts
required to register had done so.230
“San Francisco’s Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office reported that
enforcement of the registration requirement was ‘hampered by the City’s lack
of information’ because short-term rentals ‘operate in private residences
without any commercial signage posted’ and because hosting platforms ‘do not
disclose addresses or booking information about their hosts.’”231 As stated by
David Campos, a Board of Supervisors member, “Airbnb is proving that it
wants to play by its own rules, that it believes . . . it is entitled to something no
business has, absolute freedom to operate free of responsibility and
oversight . . . . It’s their way or the highway.”232 In response, San Francisco
enacted Ordinance 104-16, which amended the original Airbnb Law (Original
Modification) to require Airbnb and others like it to monitor and verify user
information or face civil and criminal penalties.233
Airbnb and Homeway (a Platform similar to Airbnb) promptly filed a
lawsuit in response the Original Modification, claiming it violated Section 230,
and moved for a preliminary injunction.234 The city changed the Original
Modification via Ordinance 178-16 (Updated Modification) and abandoned
any requirement or restrictions on the publication of rental listings, which more
squarely fit within the purview of the CDA.235 Airbnb and Homeaway argued,
however, that the ordinance still “squarely violates Section 230 by imposing
liability on Hosting Platforms for third-party transactions that directly result
from their publication of third-party listings.”236

229

Benner, supra note 228.
Airbnb, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.
231
Id. (citing Declaration of Jonathan H. Blavin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at Ex. G, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16cv-03615-JD)).
232
Benner, supra note 228.
233
S.F., Cal., Ordinance 104-16 (June 24, 2016).
234
Plaintiffs’ Joint Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Memorandum of Points &
Authorities in Supp. Thereof, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(No. 3:16-CV-03615-JD).
235
S.F., Cal., Ordinance 178-16 (Aug. 12, 2016).
236
Plaintiffs’ Joint Notice of Motion, supra note 234, at 14. The CDA includes a preemption cause:
“[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012).
230
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Judge Donato, the United States District Judge hearing the plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction, disagreed.237 For Section 230 immunity to
apply, a law must “inherently require[] the court to treat” a provider of an
interactive computer service as “the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided
by another.”238 Judge Donato found that in no way did the Updated
Modification “treat[] plaintiffs as the publishers or speakers of the rental
listings provided by hosts. It does not regulate what can or cannot be said or
posted in the listings. It creates no obligation on plaintiffs’ part to monitor,
edit, withdraw or block the content supplied by hosts.”239
Judge Donato’s argument has raised eyebrows among technology scholars
who find his distinction to be one without a difference. “If a[] rental
advertising service is structured as a marketplace, it makes no sense to display
listings for services that can’t be purchased,” writes Santa Clara law professor
Eric Goldman.240 Regardless, it is clear that the CDA may be losing its power.
As stated in a court opinion in another CDA case related to a roommate
matching site, “[t]he [CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land
on the Internet.”241 Regulators should not allow their actions to be governed by
fear that the CDA will nullify all regulations that impact Platforms, especially
regulations that do not directly regulate the publication of information, but
instead regulate Platforms’ ability to profit from undesirable transactions.
Lastly, as Platforms expand their offerings, utilizing Section 230 immunity
will become virtually impossible. Uber states that its mission is “to make
transportation as reliable as running water—everywhere and for everyone.”242
And it is making strides in the driverless car arena (although true to form, Uber
has decided to “[a]sk forgiveness, not permission” from regulators when
testing its new cars).243 These technological steps may come at a steep price;
the moment Uber develops a fleet of self-driving cars will unequivocally be the
237

Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1069, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
Id. at 1072 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)).
239
Id.
240
Eric Goldman, Section 230 Ruling Against Airbnb Puts All Online Marketplaces at Risk–Airbnb v.
San Francisco, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/11/
section-230-ruling-against-airbnb-puts-all-online-marketplaces-at-risk-airbnb-v-san-francisco.htm.
241
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008).
242
Karima Berkani, Driving Innovation at Uber, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 1, 2016), https://newsroom.
uber.com/saudi-arabia/innovation/.
243
See Mike Isaac, Uber Defies California Regulators with Self-Driving Car Service, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
16,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/technology/uber-defies-california-regulators-with-selfdriving-car-service.html?_r=0. Uber continued to use driverless cars on San Francisco streets even though
regulators considered the use illegal because Uber had not obtained the necessary permits. See id.
238

STEMLER_GALLEYPROOFS2

238

12/22/2017 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:197

moment Uber can no longer call itself just a technology company.244
Regulators should stay clear-eyed and avoid the tech company frame and the
allure of Internet exceptionalism—the notion that the Internet is inherently
different and thus needs special legal treatment—to tackle the market failures
presented by such innovations.245
C. Stay Focused on the Ends and Not the Means of Regulation
Sharing Economy Platforms are disrupters because they help provide wants
and needs—transportation, accommodation, access to capital, etc.—in cheaper
and more efficient ways. When Platforms disrupt existing ways of doing
things, regulators should be open to the idea that these new ways can
sometimes achieve the desired ends of regulation. As Orly Lobel writes,
innovative firms
provide new ways to address some of the very same social goals that
law has attempted to reach. We are accustomed to thinking in terms
of a new industry followed by a new set of regulations, but market
innovation also offers an opportunity for more foundational thinking
about the role of regulation.246

Regulators should embrace new ideas and ways to solve problems; however, as
previously discussed, they should also avoid blind reliance on new innovations
to address market failures. For example, innovations like reputation systems,
while perhaps more effective than licensing requirements, are not perfect and
should not be treated as such.
In adherence to New Governance principals, regulators should try to
incorporate a decentralized stakeholder group to create performance standards.
Performance standards focus on the ends rather than the means of
regulation.247 They specify a desired outcome, but leave the how to the specific
regulated entity.248 New York’s zero-tolerance policy for drunk driving is a

244
Lyft is also working on developing a fleet of driverless cars in partnership with General Motors.
Marco della Cava, In 5 Years, Expect Your Lyft to Drive Itself, Says Cofounder, USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2016,
2:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/18/lyft-cofounder-says-self-driving-dominates2021/90620612/.
245
See Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE:
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 165, 165 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010).
246
Lobel, supra note 15, at 117.
247
Traditional design standards specify exactly how a regulated entity should achieve compliance in
order to address market failures.
248
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects in Health, Safety, and
Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 711 (2003).
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good example of this. 249 Complaints about drunk TNC drivers must be zero,
and TNC platforms must figure out how to achieve that goal. Performancebased standards encourage creativity and flexibility, and allow people closest
to the problems to figure out the ways to solve them.250
The dispute between San Francisco and home-sharing platforms discussed
in the previous section also provides good insight into the utility of
performance standards.251 After Airbnb and Homeaway’s motion for
preliminary injunction was denied, the plaintiffs resumed talks with the city.
Eventually, Airbnb and Homeaway agreed to do what they do best: set up an
online portal. This portal will allow hosts to easily comply with San
Francisco’s registration laws, which were previously “impossible” to navigate
in many cases.252 Now, San Francisco is capitalizing on the unique
competencies of Platforms to achieve its goal of removing dangerous and
illegal hosts from the Platforms.
For performance standards to be effective, they must be monitored. This
requires sharing data, which is something Platforms have been loath to do.253
But, as Platforms are beginning to learn, sharing information is often better
than the imposition of legal liability. Case in point is Airbnb’s dealings with
the City of New Orleans.254 To operate in the city, Airbnb agreed to share data
and let the city enforce registration requirements (aided by a $1-a-night fee
collected by Airbnb).255 Airbnb was let off the hook for facilitating illegal
rentals, but the city’s goals were still achieved.

249

See supra notes 156–57.
See Lobel, supra note 15, at 159.
251
See supra Section IV.C.
252
Davey Alba, Airbnb’s San Francisco Deal Puts Storyline Over Bottom Line, WIRED (May 4, 2017,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/airbnbs-san-francisco-deal-puts-storyline-bottom-line/; Caroline
O’Donovan, Airbnb Just Settled Its Lawsuit Against San Francisco, BUZZFEED (May 1, 2017, 4:50 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/airbnb-just-settled-its-lawsuit-against-san-francisco?utm_term=
.foWMOoB831#.voM85gGepj.
253
Steven Hill, Opinion, How Airbnb Routinely Hoodwinks Your City, OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2016, 8:26
AM), http://observer.com/2016/12/how-airbnb-routinely-hoodwinks-your-city/ (discussing Platforms’
reluctance to share data).
254
Id.
255
Katie Benner, New Orleans Becomes New Model for Airbnb to Work with Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/technology/new-orleans-airbnb-model.html.
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D. If It Walks Like a Duck, Treat It Like a Duck
When companies “move fast and break things,” rhetoric is more powerful
because it is necessary to make sense of the chaos.256 This causes people to
believe that the Sharing Economy is something that “defies conventional
regulatory theory.”257 In some ways it does, but in many others, it takes the
form of traditional firms. When activities within the sharing economy appear
similar to traditional economic activities, they probably are, and should be
treated as such. For example, an Airbnb host with ten listings should have to
meet the same standards as a small hotel or bed and breakfast. When an
EatWith chef hosts meals four or more days a week at her house, she should
meet the same food safety standards as a restaurant.
Regulators should articulate which characteristics of Sharing Economy
Companies are similar to or different than their off-line analogues. When
sufficient characteristics are similar, the two types of firms should have to meet
the same standards.

CONCLUSION
In the course of every high-tech startup’s path to profitability, there will be
a point when something the company wants to do will arguably violate existing
regulations. As demonstrated by the success of the few Unicorns in the Sharing
Economy, it is an effective strategy to use opportunistic and oftencontradictory self-characterizations, which leave individual users and
regulators vulnerable to manipulation. This vulnerability can open the door for
regulatory avoidance and a host of unintended consequences and harms to
consumers, providers, and communities. Regulators should be cautious and
alert the next time they feel the zeitgeist of a new network technology
promising to change the world overnight.
It was easy for us as a society to be mystified by the Myth of the Sharing
Economy because it hit from both sides—Platforms themselves and Platform
users. Furthermore, the forces driving networked technologies create natural
monopolies, which enable firms to command attention to promote their own
views. However, by bringing stakeholders to the table, avoiding the

256
“Move fast and break things” was Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s motto for many years.
Christian Zibreg, Mark Zuckerberg Says You Need to “Move Fast and Break Things,” GEEK (Oct. 2, 2009,
3:50
PM),
https://www.geek.com/news/mark-zuckerberg-says-you-need-to-move-fast-and-break-things922432/?amp=1.
257
Lobel, supra note 15, at 90.
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intimidation of federal law, focusing on the ends instead of the means of
regulation, and articulating the differences and similarities of new and old
methods, regulators can avoid the persuasive power of myth and other
rhetorical techniques, thereby putting the public interest above the interest of
private firms. Awareness will improve regulators’ abilities to adopt measured,
innovation-friendly approaches to address market failures before companies
become too large to regulate easily, if at all.

